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THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM IN GREECE

FROM HOMER TO PINDAR

by

B. R. English



A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in the University of Toronto

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THESIS

The Problem of Freedom from Homer to Pindar

(Summary)

When a man becomes conscious of himself as in some way distinct from his environment, it may be said that the problem of freedom has arisen. It is the purpose of this thesis to examine the history of Greece from Homer to Pindar with a view to discovering the various forms in which this problem appeared, and the methods adopted from time to time in its solution.

A study of the literary evidence available seems to indicate that the problem assumed three main forms—I, the struggle for existence against the forces of nature; II, the attempt at emancipation from beliefs and thought-processes which a constantly changing physical condition rendered obsolete; and III, the political problem of reconciling human purposes and passions in society.

The Epic hero found a happy adjustment to his physical environment, and enjoyed remarkable freedom as a result; but once outside pressure disturbed his equilibrium, the Homeric spirit could find no proper home. Hesiod saw a solution to the problem of injustice in moral law. Solon, however, attacked the same problem with political weapons, and sought to co-ordinate justice and power. In Ionia during the seventh and sixth centuries B.C. liberty was confused with license, and the Greek cities ruined themselves by an insane individualism.

The conflict with Persia marked a crisis for Hellenism, and it was only because Athens saw freedom in terms of discipline and responsibility, in contrast with the ideal of heroic individualism exemplified in Pindar, that disaster was averted. Subsequent events during the fifth century, however, show that this last and greatest problem of liberty proved too difficult of solution.

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INTRODUCTION

The problem of freedom relates to the conflict between man and his environment, and involves a struggle for adjustment which is found to express itself in a variety of forms, according to the conditions that prevail in different places at different times. From a study of the history of freedom from Homer to Pindar it would appear that physical factors are of primary and universal importance. Human needs and desires may encounter effective opposition in nature, and hence follow attempts either to control nature or to find peace by conforming to and accepting her laws. This elemental struggle for existence provides man with an opportunity to prove his superiority to the beasts, and on the result of it will depend his success in coping with other forms of opposition which automatically arise to test his inability.

In the struggle for survival the mind is occupied as well as the body. Nature seems to work according to ascertainable laws; hence the mind reasons by formulating certain rules of conduct best calculated to exploit her. But this is not all: man is seldom content to limit his mental activity to the acquisition of knowledge which concerns solely the material needs of life. Just as with his activity is the expression of mind, so he seems to believe that there is an intelligence behind the workings of nature, and it is in reflecting on this mysterious power that he formulates concepts which, owing to the essence of the nature of the objects with which they deal, come to constitute

primitive religion. Such speculation will attempt some solution to the difficulties encountered, some compromise with physical forces it may be, or some way of escape from their fatal power; but speculation of this kind, once accepted, will in turn provide its own problem for men of different calibre and condition and follow after. Immediately religious concepts come into being a new phase of the struggle for freedom also appears. With improvement in man's physical condition as experience suggests new knowledge, the old concepts become outdated; but such is the power of a belief once entertained, that the modification of such belief in the light of new knowledge is invariably a painful and stubborn process. Enterprising spirits come into conflict with the sluggards, and the degree of compromise arrived at by both controls the extent of human development.

Moreover from the outset, in greater or less degree, there is involved the problem of human relationships. Man is seldom content with securing the wherewithal to live. From defensive tactics he is led to sustain the offensive. The exercise of power and the accumulation of wealth in order to gratify greed or pleasure result in social disorder. Oppression and its counterpart discontent periodically bring about some new alignment, involving a new conception of justice. Political science is eventually born and concerns itself with the function of power, the safeguard of law, and, in general, by seeking to resolve the conflict between human purposes and passions, with the stabilisation of society. The iron

From oppression and disorder thus relieved is commonly known as liberty.

Freedom is of course a purely relative term. It can never be identified with licentious irresponsibility. The casting off of one yoke is but a prelude to the assumption of another: more emancipation is not enough; and freedom always involves, sooner or later, a rigid discipline of its own formulation. And it is in this that the early history of Greece appears particularly instructive. As we proceed to examine the course taken by this struggle for freedom along the three lines indicated above - that is, in the struggle for mere existence; in the effort to keep religious beliefs up to date with new knowledge; and amidst the eternal difficulties which confront men who are obliged to live together - we shall see how orderly was the process. The discarding of obsolete forms of thought was invariably followed by a recognition the keynote of which was order, and in this order were always to a remarkable degree intellectual insight and a sense of aesthetic and moral fitness.

In the early stages of such a process it is vain to search for any consciously and specifically formulated ideas on the nature of freedom. But it appears that from the beginning men were conscious of themselves as in some way distinct from their environment, and strove constantly to re-establish their position. They were obsessed with the practical problem and incapable of rationalizing it. But the history of the early struggle must remain of cardinal importance, since fully formulated views on the subject evolved in later times

would seem to depend for their real meaning upon those early attempts to achieve liberation from oppression, without which any conception, in the strict sense of the term, could never have come into existence.

Thus we seek to justify an examination of Greek history from Homer to Pindar, with a view to tracing developments in the struggle for freedom. The conflict between Greece and Persia in the early fifth century B.C. marks a crisis for Hellenism, and thus a convenient conclusion to our study. If we seem to overstep this chronological limit by including Pindar, it is only for the reason that he appears practically untouched by the new ideas which gained force at that time, and, in his whole-hearted respect for the Dorian ideal, declares a constant but outmoded devotion to the thought of an earlier age.

CHAPTER ITHE HEROIC SPIRIT

The reading of Homer will illustrate our problem at a very rudimentary stage. It might appear at first sight that the hero with his supreme self-confidence, with his enthusiasm for all that he achieved and possessed, proves clearly that for him there is no question of freedom. These supermen are so completely self-centred as to be unconscious of themselves: there is no conflict for them, and being at peace with themselves they would seem to be at peace with the universe. But such a view as this cannot stand the test of closer investigation. It soon becomes evident that certain limits definitely imposed upon the free workings of human purpose are recognized and accepted. The hero tacitly admits at the outset that he is free to act, and like a child naively explores his province to its limits. When the end of his tether is reached, then the province of Fate begins, and the decree of Fate, if not accepted with resignation, rarely occasions more than petulant remonstrance. And if *μοῖρα* calls a final halt to all human endeavour, there are also numerous obstacles encountered before that limit is reached. Man continually finds himself at odds with those willful immortals who inhabit Olympus; his falls foul of certain sinister deities whose origins are embedded in the murky and fearful gloom of a distant past; and finally, the purposes of other men are forever obstructing the free prosecution of his desires¹. Indeed, so conspicuous is the lack of his

¹ Cf. II. XVI, 844-85, where the dying Patroclus lists the various obstacles to the fulfilment of his purpose, i. e. I. Fate, II. the Gods, III. his Trojan adversaries.

impotence at critical moments that frustration of human purpose might be considered the main theme of the Iliad.

Much has been said on the nature of Destiny in early Greek religion and philosophy¹, but at this point we do not propose to offer any treatment of the problem of origins. It is Destiny in Homer, and its function in relation to men, which is our immediate concern. Upon first examination it may appear that Destiny exerts merely a negative and restrictive influence. The limit of death is so clearly and emphatically decreed that the hero might be expected, in spite of his normal ebullience, to give way to pessimism and despair. This is one, although only one, result of his belief in Fate. Achilles is from the first aware that Thetis bore him to a brief span of life (Il. I, 352). The consciousness that his glorious manhood must of necessity pass away so soon never fails to introduce a note of pathos. This destiny is his apart from anything that the gods can do or say, as Thetis indicates in her request to Zeus - "do honour to my son, that is doomed to earliest death of all men (ἄκρομωτάτος)". Asios lends eager support to Hector in a supreme effort to break the wall and fight among the Achaian ships, but "never was he, avoiding evil Fates (κήρας), to return to windy Ilios" (Il. XII, 113). Euchenor of Corinth (Il. XIII, 665) "well knew his own ruinous fate (κήρ' ὀλοήν)", and Hector (Il. XV, 613) can hardly renounce sorrow when "short of life was he to be, yea, and already Pallas Athene was urging against him the day of destiny (πόροισιν ἤμαρ)".

¹ See F.M. Cornford. From Religion to Philosophy, Ch. I.
J.E. Harrison. Themis, Cn. X.

If, however, the effect of such fatalism were only to depress men's spirits by setting a limit to their activities, the heroic self-assurance and zest for glory would prove difficult of understanding or explanation. Such was in fact but one side of the coin. On the other side, the obverse, is clearly discernible the more positive function of Destiny. When a man believes his day is doomed, his heart is set at rest¹, at least as far as fear of lesser powers is concerned. No god's caprice or evil spirit's venom can come near him; and as for the opposition of men, he can rest supremely contemptuous of their power to destroy. Confidence in destiny would render Ares ἄλλοπρόσαλλος (Il. V, 831) a less formidable enemy, and Zeus himself was frequently exasperated by the ἄπαισι of Hera (Il. XV, 51). Pallas Athene's sinister influence (Il. XVIII, 311) could be met with greater confidence, although her ruse (Il. XXII, 227) upon occasion may seem to hasten Hector's end. For men less confident in Destiny the flight of birds and other sorcery, or the loud contumely of an enemy, and the resounding clash of bronze accoutrement, might well have held out constant terror.

This confidence in Fate is voiced by Menelaus when he seeks to undertake in a duel the issue of the war (Il. III, 101). "For whichever of us death and fate (μοῖρα) are prepared, let him lie dead." Achilles is reminded by his horse Xanthus that no accident can affect his span of life (Il. XIX, 409). "Yea verily for this hour, dread Achilles, we will still bear thee safe, yet is thy death-day nigh at

¹ See H. V. Routh. God, Man, and Epic Poetry. Vol. I, Ch. III.

hand, neither shall we be the cause thereof, but a mighty and forceful Fate (μοῖρα κραταίη) . . . to thee thyself is appointed (μορομὸν ἔστι) to be slain in fight by a god and by a man.' But emancipation from fear as a corollary of this belief is most clearly seen in Hector's words to Andromache (Il. VI, 487): "Dear one, I pray thee be not of oversorrowful heart: no man against my Fate (ἔτι δ' ἄποδεν) shall hurl me to Hades; only Destiny (μοῖρα) no man hath escaped."

The part played by Destiny then is of capital importance in determining to what extent and in what way Homer's people are free. So far from being an obsession causing for paralysis of the will, such belief is in point of fact the greatest spur to initiative and enterprise. Belief in this predestination in the matter of death is the prerequisite and very essence of their faith, and the Homeric hero, like his counterpart in every age, lives by such faith. It is noticeable that Destiny does not apply to the course of life so much as to the end of life. The word μοῖρα (cf. Il. IX, 318) indicates a portion or share, and thus emphasizes the notion of limit. Similarly in the case of ἀΐσα (Il. XVIII, 327), an allotment is concerned with determination. The hero thought of Destiny in this way as imposing a final limit. He did not regard it as exercising any influence on the nature or character of life while it lasted. Hence its emancipatory effect. The utmost freedom of action was possible between the nature of his birth and death. We are occasionally confronted, however, with the term κῆρ or κῆρας, suggesting some connection with Destiny. The κῆρ is at times man's presiding genius. As

representing the individuals concerned, the *κῆρες* may be weighed by some god and their relative merit or efficiency determined. Thus is explained the temporary triumph of Trojans over Achaeans (Il. VIII, 73), or the final victory of Achilles over Hector (Il. XXII, 310). On the other hand Achilles speaks of two-fold fates, *διπλασια κῆρας*, bearing him on to death (Il. IX, 411). He is conscious of two selves using different courses but leading to the same end. That is to say, there emerges a compulsive power which determines the nature of conduct. Similarly the dead Patroclus complains of his *στυγερὴ κῆρ*, which had haunted him since birth (Il. XXIII, 79). As we might say, he had never been able to get away from himself. Finally, the *κῆρας* are regarded as malevolent and maleficent powers that bring destruction. The *κῆρας* of black death led the Trojans on (Il. II, 834), and dread death, *κῆρ ὀλοή*, is figured on Achilles' shield as dragging men away (Il. XVIII, 535). Thus the *κῆρας*, although at times represented as sinister powers, do not radically affect the hero's view of Destiny. It is tempting to attribute their presence in the Iliad to a survival of earlier religious conceptions which had gradually lost hold upon the human imagination.

But if the hero's self-confidence and faith spring from this belief in Destiny, just how does he stand in relation to his gods? What is their function? The Olympians are in a manner the children of men and they naturally exhibit the characteristics, strong and weak, of their human creators .

¹ vid. M. P. Millson. Homer and Mycenae, Ch. VII }.

The gibes of later moralists like Xenophanes¹ are lively but irrelevant, and illustrate to a marked degree their misunderstanding of the divine role. Homer's men 'had emerged from the stagnant fear of death, of darkness and of demons, and had created gods at the summit of nature, as witnesses of their spirit'. They had rehabilitated former disreputable deities and brought them up to date so as to meet the needs of a new and more enlightened age. Zeus for instance had by human aid risen high in the world, and parvenu that he is, carefully avoids dropping any hint as to his earlier condition and associates. It is religious art alone that betrays his secret²; but considering how civilized he has grown, we are not inclined to hold his earlier association with the snake against him, nor do we consider his failure to meet the spiritual needs of a later and vastly different society of men any real indictment of his character. For this very reason, that men had created gods in their own image, there was every likelihood that subsequent generations with different needs and aims would repeat the process for themselves. *Homer's men, like children, if left to themselves,* would gradually rationalize the figments of their imagination as they gained more enlightenment. If, on the other hand, the creatures of a people's fancy are looked upon as having any significance apart from the peculiar point of view which they

¹ πάντα θεοῖσ' ἀνέβησαν Ὀυρεὸς δ' Ἠολόδοσ τε
 ὄσση παρ' ἀνθρώποισιν ἐβείδα καὶ νόμος ἐστὶν
 κλέπτειν μοιχεύειν τε καὶ ἀδανεύειν ἀτασθαλίᾳ
 Diels Vorsokratiker 21 Xenophanes B. 11.

² C.F. The two reliefs found at the Peiraieus and now in the Berlin Museum, reproduced by J. M. Harrison, *Trolemomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, Ch. I, p. 19 ff.

reflect, untold harm will result for others whose different needs they obviously fail to satisfy. It is when the honey of objective reality, a favoured obsession of professional moralists in dealing with the gods, raises its head, that the natural process of development is arrested, and gods and men, formerly on the most familiar terms, are set at variance, both being asked to do something for which they are unsuited by nature. Fortunately, owing to the absence of priestly dominance, the Greeks suffered less than most people from the tyranny of outworn moral and religious conceptions.

The hero was not a moralist, neither was Homer. Ares and Aphrodite, Hera and Apollo, Athene and Thetis, all unconsciously represent among more or less normal characteristics some outstanding quality, either good or bad, with which their creators are thoroughly familiar. It is true that at times they appear to enjoy a more precise knowledge of the future, as when Zeus tells Hera of Patroclus' impending doom (II. X⁷, 65-7). But this foreknowledge may easily be overemphasized, and, as will be seen later, ought really to be explained as a technical dramatic device¹. The gods are actually the peers of man and not his masters. As creatures they are honoured by their creators as long as they minister to human achievement. In their renovated form these deities have lost their original sting, and while they may exasperate, they are as ineffectual to intimidate as ever such gods should be. They have a much more divine function to discharge in suffering than in to create

¹ Vico p. 15 § 2

effort, by infusing courage in the place of despair, in magnifying human ideals and over extending the range of human achievement. Zeus is the benefactor and Apollo the sympathetic ally of Hector at a time of crisis (Il. XV, 339). Athena is in a manner the familiar friend of Odysseus and Diomedes (Il. X, 277-95). She knows their secret longings; she sanctions their efforts, and by inspiration prompts their success. Zeus and all the gods are on Hector's side in securing and glorifying the future of Astyanax (Il. VI, 476-81). Achilles looks to Zeus to bring glory to Patroclus (Il. XVI, 255-48), while Thetis never ceases to bring her son comfort and encouragement.

Frequently, however, the hero is aware of sharp conflict between his will and divine purpose. Athena takes away men's wit and prompts them to follow the rash bidding of Hector (Il. XVIII, 510-12). Achilles in bemoaning the fate of Patroclus observes that Zeus does not always accomplish the purposes of men (Il. XVIII, 528). But when Achilles pretends to upbraid the gods for causing men to fall upon pain and misery while they themselves remain sorrowless (Il. XXIV, 525-6), we see plainly (taking into account the whole incident) that the so-called will of the gods is but the reflection of (in this case) man's passionate folly, his *ἄτης*. Priam, with pathetic generosity, absolves Helen of responsibility for the war (Il. III, 154-5). The gods, he says, are to blame. But the impotence of Aphrodite to stop the tide of disaster which she has let loose must find its ultimate explanation in human infirmity. Priam is unconsciously speaking of the tide of

human passion which leaves disillusionment and disaster in its wake. Similarly the disclaimer of Agamemnon is but a subterfuge (Il. XII, 85-9). He may plead that Zeus and Moira and Erinyes put into his soul fierce madness, prompting him to rob Achilles of his rightful property, but the heroes cannot but hold him responsible. Odysseus replies, "and thou, son of Atreus, towards others shalt be more righteous hereafter; for no shame is it that a man that is a king should make amends if he ^have been the first to deal violently" (XIX, 181-3). "Even Zeus", says Agamemnon, "was blinded by atê once upon a time; he who they say is greatest among gods and men" (XIX, 95) thus pointing to a human characteristic, soul-madness, for which the individual can blame none but himself.

Thus it appears that in dealing with the gods man is really dealing with himself. In providing sanctions for human inclinations or propensities the gods help those who help themselves, those whose affections are set on some high purpose; and, contrariwise, they also encourage men in self-deception and expedite their course to destruction. But in either case the important point is that man contains within himself the determination of his own condition. Of course the hero recognizes his human limitations; any sensible man must; but within the limits of his freedom he resents all interference. He is superbly intolerant of opposition, and when thwarted he will not hesitate to curse those gods on whose inspiration he depends for success¹. He must at all costs maintain his self-

¹ Cf. Il. XIII, 15 ff.

respect, and will remain always the supreme judge of his own welfare. Such is the heroic point of view. Fate is anthropomorphic nature and an accident: it offers no excuse and holds none. Only when taken out of its proper setting and forced to supply needs with which it is unfamiliar does it appear ludicrous and ineffective.

In accordance with this anthropomorphic view, it is necessary that the power of Fate, which reaches man's forehead during their lifetime, apply also to the gods in their dealings with men. Not of course to the span of their existence, for in order to be gods they must be immortal, but rather to the range of their activity. Poseidon is incipient with Zeus oversteering the limits of his province¹, and looks upon the decree of Fate as a protection against the selfish will of his powerful brother. 'In three lots are all things divided, and each drew a domain of his own, and to me fell the rocky sea, to be my habitation for ever, when we shook the lots; and Hades drew the earth and underworld, and Zeus the wide heaven, in clear air and clouds, but the earth and high Olympus are yet common to all' (Il. XV, 189). Zeus chafes at the cruelty of destiny in ordaining the death of his son Sarpedon² (Il. XVI, 435-8), but decides not to make it a test of strength. He is content to side his side without un-

¹ Zeus is predisposed to cross it. But, when he, his brother, decides to preside over the discommodations of Fate.

² This has been explained with reference to the artistic technique of the Iliad; for instance, that Homer is reluctant to let his character go. But it is more probable, surely, that here we are witnessing Zeus' initial metamorphosis. He had been the head of the Olympian family: he must now appear as the supreme god of men.

ing influenced either way by Hera's sneering expectation. Apollo, a lesser power than Zeus, accepts without comment the decree of Fate and gives Hector over to death (II. XIII, 215).

It has already been suggested¹ that the nature of the gods is to some extent governed by the demands of dramatic technique. The foreknowledge shown by Zeus in outlining to Hera the precise events of the battle about to take place (II. XV, 65-67) points undoubtedly to a technical device of the poet. The gods must provide the pattern according to which the artistic scheme is to be worked out. But such prescience on the part of the gods is readily recognizable as an artifice, since it is incompatible with their proper character. We have shown that they were bound by Fate just as were men. Destiny had ordained that the hero should enjoy an allotted span of life, and with this no god could interfere. The Olympians may want to juggle with the ultimate decrees of Fate, but they also knew that they were powerless to do so. Within the destined limits of man's life, however, they are free to act. The enterprise and resourcefulness they display in attempting to control the destiny of events proves that they enjoy no real prescience. Most of their intervention, moreover, can be explained in terms of human weakness and strength, and the problem of freedom for the hero in respect of his gods did not imply a struggle

¹ See page // and Note 3, page 14.

² Cf. also the prophecy of the Olympic deities (II. XVI, 351-4).

against external tyrannical powers so much as with his own passions and weaknesses.

Before leaving the nature of the Homeric gods and their relationship to men there remains to be examined the question of Zeus' restlessness, his tendency to overstep the limits originally assigned to him and assume for himself not merely the supreme power on Olympus, but the control of Fate as well. Zeus is represented as the avenger of Achilles' wrong, and in order that retribution be made, the Achaians must suffer a temporary reverse (Il. VIII, 69-74). "Then did the Father balance his golden scales, and put therein two fates of death, one for horse-taming Trojans, one for mail-clad Achaians; and he took the scale-yard by the midst and lifted it, and the Achaians' day of destiny sank down." There seems some confusion at this point. Victory for the Trojans presumably means that the day of Destiny has arrived for many Achaians. But we notice that this decree of Fate is completely in accord with Zeus' will. Here once more ¹ dramatic requirements force themselves upon our attention, but in view of other evidence they cannot substantiate an exclusive claim. Zeus is something more than a mere dispenser of Fate, or a "steward of the mysteries"; his purpose on behalf of Achilles is identified in a very striking way with the doom of Destiny. In a passage already quoted (Il. XV, 189) he is represented as rebelling against the restrictions of his original province and trespassing upon the domain of his colleagues. In a further passage quoted (Il. XVI, 433-8) the very suggestion that he should question the finality of Fate's decree concerning Sarpedon indicates an imminent

¹ Cf. page 14

enlargement of his province. The picture of Hector fleeing before a ruthless Achilles (Il. XXII, 168-76) calls from Zeus an expression of pity. He is able either to save Hector's life or take it away, and Athene admits his power but deplures the factor of justice or pity entering in. She wants things to take their destined course. Zeus, however, is changing; he had been a capricious ruler, and any frustration of his purpose had summoned forth outbursts of passionate indignation; but he was now to assume a more constitutional role, and frequently appear as the voice of Destiny. He is also represented as "spinning the lot" for miserable men, dispensing a mixture of good and evil, so that men chance now upon evil, now again on good (Il. XXIV, 514-51). This term "spinning the lot" (ἑπεκλώσαντο) is itself suggestive of the Fates spinning the threads of Destiny.¹

The simile used in Bk. XVI, 384-93, illustrates further development in the character of Zeus. Men incur his wrath because they judge crooked judgments and drive justice out. His moral attributes are here apparent. Moreover we learn from Phoenix (Il. IX, 501 ff.) that "Prayers of penitence are daughters of great Zeus, halting and wrinkled and of eyes ashen, that have their task withal to go in the steps of Sin. For Sin is strong and fleet of foot, wherefore she far outrunneth all Prayers, and goeth before them over all the earth making men fall, and Prayers follow behind to heal the harm." When men fail to reverence them they depart and

¹ Od. VII, 197. The reading is doubtful at this point. The Oxford text is followed, where the Fates themselves are called

make prayer to Zeus that destruction may come upon such an one, that he may fall and pay the price". Here we note that with justice is combined the idea of mercy

Achilles comes to see that there is something nobler in life than mere personal glory. Passionate feeling proves an unreliable guide; motives of revenge bear only bitter fruit; but justice and mercy can bring a man peace at the last. Thus, as we might expect, is reflected the increasing enlightenment of men. Zeus comes more and more to be a projection of man's best selves, and as a "power working for righteousness" he leaves his older, cruder self behind and supersedes the authority of the blind sisters. Blind implacable Fate passes out of the picture temporarily and we discern a curious anticipation of the Sophoclean and Platonic doctrine that destiny is character. There is as yet no idea of a "jealous" god. Such a notion developed later and represented a reversion to more primitive ways of thought. Destiny, which originally marked off limits to the freedom of human activity in a purely impersonal manner, came to assume a sinister personality. Under the name of Zeus it forgot its earlier promise and became invested with those capricious humours from which Homeric man had gone so far in emancipating himself and his gods.

There is a marked absence of superstition in the Homeric cult of the Olympians. When we read that Asios was not to avoid evil Fates (*κακὰς ὑπὸ κήρας ἀλύξας* Il. XII, 113), a somewhat sinister note is struck¹, but the impression is

¹ Cf. the examination of *ἄγρ : κούρα* p. 8 ff.

corrected when it transpires that Fate (*μοῖρα*) eventually overtook him. When the ghost of Patroclus appeared to Achilles in sleep pleading for the burial of the poor maimed body (Il. XXIII, 65) there are summoned up the gruesome horrors of an earlier age. The remnant of Patroclus was harried by the "phantoms of men outworn (*εἶδωλα καμόντων*)" and could find no rest. But after all, this was but a dream. We know that with the cessation of the cult of the dead their power over the living had been broken, and it is interesting to note that in his account of the burial of Patroclus the poet makes no reference to the function which the sacrifice of ~~Trojan~~ prisoners, ^{horses} ~~herces~~, dogs and sheep had performed in the funeral-cult of earlier times¹. Polydamas gives expression to those superstitious fears which had held men enthralled in earlier days when he counsels pause in the attack upon the Achaian ships (Il. XII, 211). But Hector leaves no doubt as to his contempt for omens: "Thou bidst us be obedient to birds long of wing, whereto I give no heed, whether they fare to the right, to the dawn and to the sun, or to the left, to mist and darkness. Nay, for us, let us trust to the counsel of mighty Zeus, who is king over all mortals and immortals. One omen is best, to fight for our own country."

There is a strong suggestion of magic in the events surrounding the quarrel between Achilles and Agamemnon². But the pestilence with which Apollo afflicted the host

¹ Cf. M. P. Nilsson. History of Greek Religion, Ch. V, p. 140

² Il. I, 9 ff.

through his darts, the sooth-saying of Calchas who "knew both things that were and that should be and that had been before" actually point to a breach of honour on the part of Agamemnon, and there is nothing magical about the restitution to be made. That is to say, the quarrel has such a clear-cut and definite cause; the issue can be so clearly stated in terms of human passion and interest, that the action of Apollo and its elucidation by Calchas, appear only superfluous. Indeed it seems that magic was definitely a thing of the past, much of its paraphernalia perhaps being adapted to new uses, so often do snakes, eagles, birds, and the like appear in the Homeric similes.

From this study of the relationship between man and destiny, and between man and his gods, it is apparent the Homeric hero had asserted a strong claim to freedom of thought and action. And where there is evident such a stern struggle against restrictions imposed by traditional belief upon human freedom, we may expect a particular application in the matter of purely human relationships. Destiny and the Olympian gods, by checking and guiding man's activities, brought a measure of discipline and order to bear upon the free play of his desires, and thus exercised in the main a salutary influence; and we may proceed to examine in what manner the hero responded to those social restrictions the need for which inevitably appears when men mingle together. In the Iliad there is nowhere apparent what might be called a crystallized form of political authority. Human leaders, like divine leaders, receive ^{only} deference/as long as their superior ¹ might and wisdom warrant it.

1 Cf. Agamemnon and Thersites, Bk. II: Agamemnon and Achilles, Bk. I: Agamemnon and the Achaeans, Bk. XIX, 85: Hector and Paris: Hector and Polydamas, Bk. XII, 311.

At the same time there are certain unwritten rules for public behaviour, things done and not done. There is nothing to prevent Thersites (Il. II, 212) from having his say if he so desires. In true demagogic fashion he may slander Agamemnon without violating any section of the constitution. But such a rabid individualist will, if he is wise, give way to social pressure. If he persist in violating customs he must eventually suffer the penalty of isolation. Achilles and Agamemnon both learned this lesson thoroughly. They discovered that it was impossible for men to live together in harmony unless they are prepared to compromise their interests. And such compromise is not really self-sacrifice; it is merely the reflection in society of that personal discipline and orderliness which is so essential if man is to preserve peace and harmony in himself. The inner law evolved by the individual to govern his conduct in relation to the group is called aidos¹. But it can seldom be called a law, since it is so often a mere emotion and devoid of principle. It would also appear that the attitude of onlookers is indicated by the term Nemesis². Nemesis is social pressure, and may be applied by gods or men. But both aidos and nemesis are too capricious to offer a guiding principle for social life, and in Homer we note an attempt to crystallize some such rule in the form of Themis³. It can also be shown, in accordance with our thesis elsewhere⁴, that these two,

¹ Cf. G. Murray. The Rise of the Greek Epic, Lecture III, p. 88, where it is stated that aidos is equivalent of what we call a sense of social responsibility.

² Vid. Il. III, 156: 410: IX, 525: XIII, 95 ff.

³ Gustave Glotz. Histoire Gréque, Tome 1^{er}, p. 121-2, defines aidos as "morale familiale", and themis as "droit familial". Thus the close relationship between the two is recognized; but it is difficult to see how in Homer the restrictive "familial" can be allowed.

⁴ Vid. p. 4

Themis and Aidos apply in like manner to gods and men.

When Hera complains so bitterly to Zeus of Ares' irresponsible conduct in playing havoc among the Achaeans (Il. V, 757-63), she accuses him of transgressing the general rules, or what is on Olympus commonly held to be right (*οὐ τινα οἶδε θεμιστα*). He is doing something which is "not done": he is the "enfant terrible". Agamemnon prompted by a dream proposes to make an immediate attack upon Troy (Il. II, 56-75). But he is not sure of the general feeling; some may wish to board their ships and flee home. He wishes therefore to test them in accordance with custom (*ἢ θεμισ ἐστὶ*). Here the leader's authority is clearly seen as based ultimately upon group consent. Men occasionally judge crooked judgments (*σκολιὰς κρίσεις θεμιστας*) and thus incur the wrath of God (Il. XVI, 387) who visits them with punishment (*δίκη*) once justice is driven out. This would seem to be a case of that self-imposed discipline to which all alike must conform if freedom is to be assured and tyranny avoided. Themis calls the gods to council (Il. XX, 4) and is Hera's logical confidante when the overweening wilfulness of Zeus is called into question (Il. XI, 87).

Hence *θεμισ* and *θεμιστας* ought not to be regarded merely as dooms or specific judgments of Zeus¹. That they are not divine judgments delivered by a king is shown in Il. XVI, 387, where men in council are represented as formulating them. Moreover the use of both singular and plural, *themis* and *themises*, is in itself no proof of their being merely judgments. *Themises* are primitive political regulations found by experience to have practical value in socializing men's

¹ Cf. Sir Henry Maine. Ancient Law, Ch. I.

natural instincts. Themis, so far from proceeding from Olympus, is reflected thither from the earth, and as the substance changes on earth, when more enlightened ideas of justice and law prevail, so will its shadow change in heaven.

Aidos is the specific application of Themis to the individual. In *Il.* XIII, 95-124 Poseidon chides the Achaeans for their sloth. The camp is in danger of capture, and all because the people are at strife with their chief and have no heart to defend the ships. Each man was guilty of Achilles' error, in allowing personal resentment to prevent effective action. They should be ashamed of themselves (*Ἄιδῶς, Ἀργεῖοι, κοῦροι υἱοί*); they must each and all regulate their tumultuous feeling, discipline it, and press it into the service of their united purpose (*ἀλλ' ἐν φρεσὶ θείετε ἕκαστος αἰδῶ καὶ γυμνασέσθω*). Similarly Aias urges on the Argives (*Il.* XV, 561-4). The *aidos* which each must "take into his heart" is the consciousness of what other men or the group in general expect of him. It involves the regulation of immediate personal desires in accordance with more far-reaching requirements (*Cf.* *Il.* XV, 657). Zeus, together with the other gods, is incensed at Achilles' implacable spirit in doing violence to the body of Hector (*Il.* XXIV, 113). His natural inclination is to intervene on Hector's behalf, but *aidos* checks this and he prefers with the aid of Thetis to prevail upon Achilles to relent.

It is interesting to note that *aidos* also refers upon occasion to physical nakedness (*Cf.* *Il.* II, 263, and XXII, 75), a condition which must be modified in answer to social demands. Once more the individual in entering society is called upon to compromise what

appear to be his natural rights and submit to Themis in the interest of all.

Thus the Iliad presents a series of illuminating situations involving severe conflict between man and his environment. That the heroes made no attempt to formulate the problem with which, in some form or other, they were constantly confronted, does not detract from its vital importance. They were not at all inclined to reflection: they were eminently practical, and their ideals for the most part found complete satisfaction in conduct. But the type of opposition which they encountered would sooner or later demand more careful attention. When conditions changed, and the checks upon freedom manifestly outweighed the joy of achievement, then conflict was taken more to heart, and attempts at resolving it became infinitely more complex. The Iliad has to do with war. Gods and men are keyed to fever pitch, and their method of dealing with opposition is forceful and direct, although there are signs, as in the case of Achilles after the death of Hector, that such tactics occasion considerable doubt. In the Odyssey this simple directness, characteristic of the Iliad, is conspicuously absent. The Iliad reveals the unity and concentration of effort called into being by military enterprise; but the Odyssey deals with the aftermath of war. At first sight the Odyssey appears "calmer, more reflective, more religious than the Iliad, being a poem of peace"¹, but such a view is misleading if we neglect also to notice certain unmistakable signs of social upheaval which herald the disruption of feudal society. One vital connection between the two epic poems

¹ A. Lang. Homer and His Age, Ch. IX, p. 232

would seem to be that in the *Odyssey* are more graphically depicted those factors which gradually broke down heroic life, factors which are not so prominent in the *Iliad*, since war is a greedy theme, and tends to distract attention from other forms of activity. Behind the proud and confident exterior of heroic life, however, there appears a strong inclination to question the nature of authority. In the *Iliad* we noted that while reverence for the king is deep-rooted, he differs from his peers in degree rather than in essence¹. Agamemnon claimed he was more kingly (βασιλευτέρως) than Achilles (*Il.* IX, 160); hence it was suggested that kingly prestige depended largely upon patent superiority. One of many sons of Zeus (Διογενέες) Agamemnon was really "primus inter pares", and constantly subject to the veto of his fellow basileis². Nor was the king compelled to consider the opinions only of his peers. Alcibiades when devising means for conducting Odysseus back to his native land considers it proper to consult, in addition to the captains of the Phaeacians, the elders (γέροντες) of the people (*Od.* VII, 189). The feelings of the assembly are also taken into account. The Achaeans were summoned to consider the havoc wrought by Apollo (*Il.* I, 54), the advisability of an immediate attack upon Troy (*Il.* II, 50 ff), or the quarrel between Agamemnon and Achilles (*Il.* IX, 10 ff.). And in the *Odyssey* the assembly appears a much more regular and powerful institution. Telemachus consults the people in the matter of

¹ Vid. p. 20

² The peculiar honours and responsibilities accruing to kingship are set forth clearly by Clotz and Cohen. *Histoire Grecque*, Tome 1^{er}, pp. 127-130.

the suitors (Od. II, 6 ff); Alcinous, when public entertainment for Odysseus is contemplated (Od. VIII, 4 f.): Antiphates is found by Odysseus and his men in the assembly of the Laestrygons (Od. X, 114); and Antinous fears loss of the people's support in his feud with Telemachus (Od. XVI, 376 ff.). Euphithes, enraged at the death of his son Antinous, seeks to rouse popular feeling against Odysseus by haranguing the people (Od. XXIV, 420); and the importance of the people is implied when Mentor upbraids them for tolerating the insolence of the suitors (Od. II, 239).

This restriction of royal prerogative and decentralization of authority was symptomatic of far-reaching changes taking place in social and political organization. City life, in which common interests were gradually supplanting common blood as the unifying factor, was slowly corrupting the ancient institutions. We hear of patronomics being divided. The sons of Castor, half-brother of Odysseus, split their father's estate by casting lots (Od. XIV, 208-10). Odysseus, although receiving only a very small share at his father's death, had practised piracy to gain great wealth (Od. XIV, 234), and had been enabled to marry the daughter of a wealthy landowner (Od. XIV, 211). Independence of agriculture, development of commercial enterprise, the accumulation of movable property, the pronounced cleavage between rich and poor - all these factors tended to break down the old sanctions and pave the way for a new order.

Perhaps this change of focus in the matter of authority can be best illustrated from the experiences of Odysseus and his immediate associates, particularly in their attitude to

the gods. The special virtues attributed to Odysseus, self-control, and ability to avoid danger by strategem, suggest that conduct was not such a simple matter for him as for most of his fellow-heroes. He can be forthright upon occasion in dealing with his fellow-men, belabouring Thersites for insolence, Il. II, 265 ff., stimulating the flagging spirit of Diomedes in battle (Il. XI, 313 ff.), or, pouring scorn upon Agamemnon for his cowardice (Il. XIV, 83). In resentment at false imputation he can oppose Agamemnon with much vigour (Il. IV, 350 ff); but at other times he vacillates. Nestor had lost his horses and was in immediate danger of suffering death at the hands of Hector, but Odysseus thought discretion the better part of valour and forsook the old warrior, paying no heed to the rebuke of Diomedes (Il. VIII, 97 ff). Incensed at Agamemnon because of the quarrel he would like to withdraw his support, but he hesitates to follow the example of Achilles, and, guided by Athene, remains loyal to Agamemnon (Il. II, 173 ff). Again, he is prompted to flee from the Trojans after Diomedes is wounded, and it is only after considerable misgiving that a brave spirit triumphed (Il. XI, 404 ff). When setting out with Diomedes to spy upon the Trojan camp he prays to Athene for success. The prayer is very intimate, without showing any sign of servility. There is also absent the contractual element so noticeable in the prayer of Diomedes that follows. On the other hand Odysseus stresses the value of Athene's friendship and of her companionship in his toils (Il. X, 280 ff).

~~In the Odyssey it appears that this element of doubt and uncertainty is much magnified. The trials involved in the~~

When we undertake to discover the manner in which Homer's men respond to opposition, whether such opposition take the form of *μοῖρα*, the will of the Olympian deities, or the cross purposes of other men, certain inconsistencies are bound to appear. It will often seem that change has taken or is taking place, and the question of time is bound to arise. As an example we may cite our treatment of Zeus in the Iliad (pp. 16 ff.). This question of time will refer not only to when the Iliad and Odyssey were composed, but also to the subject matter of each: of what age is the poet speaking in this section or that: when dealing with this or that practice: this institution or that religious sentiment. But we submit that the extremely complex problem of Homeric dates and authorship remains outside the scope of this thesis.

The main controversial works on the Homeric problem, such as those of Grote, Wilamowitz-Möllenaerf, Monro, Murray, Chadwick, Croiset, Allen, and Millson, have been consulted. And while the view of Millson, whose research leads to the conclusion on page 208 of his "Homer and Mycenae", appears most convincing, we see no point in listing a series of tentative dates borrowed from the work of specialists in the field. Where there is so much disagreement concerning the time both of compilation and recorded incident, any attempt to deal with our particular problem from that point of view would be doomed at the outset. Consequently we choose to take the poems as they stand, and to note how individuals concerned respond to the challenge of their environment. Sometimes change is apparent, and perhaps we may speak of logical change or development where precise knowledge of chronology is wanting.

In the *Odyssey* ²³ it appears that this element of doubt and uncertainty is much magnified. The trials involved in the return from Troy threatened to rob Odysseus of all self-confidence. The man of supreme resourcefulness and self-control became more impressed by adverse circumstances than by his own right of way, and under the burden of misfortune was prone to throw himself upon the mercy of protectors human or divine. After a hazardous journey by sea Odysseus finally came to the land of the Phaeacians. He went to the famous palace of Alcinous "and his heart was full of many thoughts as he stood there". There is something pathetic in his humble supplication to Arete, wife of Alcinous, for deliverance from his unhappy lot (Od. VII, 150): Too long, he says, has he suffered affliction far from his friends: frustration is no longer answered by indignant rebellion; heroic wrath gives way to fatalistic grief. Odysseus, weary of Calypso, bewails his enforced imprisonment on the island of Ogygia - "His eyes were never dry of tears, and his sweet life was ebbing away as he mourned for his return" (Od. V, 151). Even the nymph's promise to release him is received with suspicion (Od. V, 175): misfortune has so unnerved him that he suspects an ulterior motive. While enjoying the hospitality of Alcinous he cannot bear to recall his unhappy plight: "Drawing his purple cloak over his head he hid his face, for he was ashamed to shed tears in the presence of the Phaeacians" (Od. VIII, 84). His converse with the shades of the nether world impressed him with the tragic sorrow of mortal life (Od. XI, 33 ff.).

Loss of nerve is also noticeable in the case of Telemachus and Penelope. Telemachus constantly deplores the encroachment of the suitors, and his impotence to resist them brings nothing

but pain (Od. I, 113 ff: 1b. 230 ff: 1b. 252 ff: 1b. 368 ff). In the same manner Penelope is overcome with sorrow at the turn things have taken (Od. I, 334).

This obsession with the futility of human effort brought about a marked change in the relationship between man and his gods. Peisistratus, son of Nestor, hoped that Telemachus made use of prayer, since "all men stand in need of the gods" (Od. III, 48). Telemachus knew this well, and in moments of despondency looked to Athene for encouragement. The goddess inspired him to fresh effort (Od. III, 14 ff.), and "plants might and courage in his spirit" (Od. I, 320 ff.). Penelope is so oppressed with sorrow that she petitions Artemis for the "soft release of death" (Od. XVIII, 202). Athene, displaying her constant sollicitude for Odysseus, reminds her father that her mortal friend deserves a better fate (Od. V, 11 ff.). The hero himself, overwhelmed by the stormy sea, makes supplication to Zeus and seeks to enlist divine pity (Od. V, 445 ff.). At another time he prays to Athene for deliverance from the Phaeacians (Od. VI, 324 ff.).

Thus the function of Athene is to minister comfort and implant hope. She reminds Telemachus that the situation might be worse (Od. III, 320 ff.). The toil which Odysseus endures is in the nature of penance perhaps, and is undoubtedly preferable to the disaster which befell Agamemnon after his more speedy return to Argos. Menelaus suffered also, only winning his way home after much troublesome wandering (Od. IV, 78 ff.). The goddess strengthens Odysseus in his struggle with Irus, that menial who vaunts his vulgar self-assertion in the very

home of the hero (Od. XVIII, 66 ff.). She inspires both father and son for the impending conflict with the suitors (Od. XIX, 29 ff.), and refreshes the hero's flagging spirit when obstacles appear insurmountable (Od. XX, 36 ff.). His despondency calls forth strong rebuke at times tempered by friendly assurance (Od. XXII, 254 ff.). Odysseus was, however, enabled to accomplish his purpose in the end, but his reward of happiness was to depend upon obedience to the grey-eyed goddess and upon abstention from the "strife of even-handed war" (Od. XXIV), the vital nourishment, it may be noted, of the heroic soul.

Thus in the *Odyssey* the hero appears less self-reliant than in the *Iliad*, and it is perhaps not accidental that *μοῖρα*, in the sense of destiny, and involving emancipation from fear, is hardly in evidence. We find frequent use of the term where a "lot" or portion is implied: Achilles had embarked unscathed with his share (*μοῖραν*) of the spoil (Od. XI, 84): the servants distribute the portions (*μοῖρας*) and mix the wine (Od. VIII, 470)¹.

Occasionally *μοῖρα* is used in the sense of destiny. Zeus knows what things are fated and what not fated (*μοῖραν τ' ἀμφοτέρω*) for mortal men (Od. XX, 76): he orders Calypso to release Odysseus, "since it is his fate (*μοῖρα*) to look on his friends again" (Od. V, 114). *Moirai* may be equivalent to the will of the Immortals, since "the doom of the gods (*μοῖρα θεῶν*) condemned Clytemnestra to ruin" (Od. III, 269). At other times destiny is signified by *αἴμα* (Od. VII, 197: V, 114). But nowhere is there the suggestion that belief in fate resulted

¹ See also Od. III, 66: IV, 97: XIV, 448: XV, 140: XV, 171: 280

in new confidence, as seemed to be the case in the Iliad (see p. 7 ff.).

Thus curtailment of the hero's freedom is indicated both by his greater need for divine help and by the absence of any suggestion that *noia* inspired him with additional courage to face opposition. This modification of the heroic temper traceable in the Iliad and the Odyssey was symptomatic of the change taking place in society, and helps to prepare us for the revelation of subsequent literature which deals with a world unintelligible when judged by heroic standards.

CHAPTER IIOPPRESSION AND DEMORALIZATION:HESIOD AND THE ^RBIRTH OF HUMAN DIGNITY.

A consideration of the heroic point of view leaves one with an impression of its extraordinary liberality. It seems to augur well for men's future condition that they have so far shaken themselves free from the corrosive shackles of superstition and fear as to make religious beliefs ultimately subordinate to spiritual freedom and human enterprise. Facts, it seems, must ever determine the nature of fancies, and the general charge that men fashion their own beliefs only to become enslaved to them ¹ encounters effective rebuttal. However, for the ingenuous faith that would make of man a completely responsible being, able to guide his own destiny by means of spirit or reason, the study of history provides a proper corrective. Numerous factors subsequently enter in to prevent fulfilment of early promise: from ever-changing permutations and combinations of human society in its physical environment there arise similarly changing attitudes and tendencies. "All is flux", as Heraclitus was later to observe.

In the Iliad the chieftains claim our exclusive interest. Their less noble contemporaries, whose sole function it was to provide for the comfort of their lordly masters, are ignored as if beneath contempt. And while in the Odyssey lowly people, such as beggars and swineherds, force themselves from time to time upon the attention ², yet the main interest continues

¹ Fustel de Coulanges. La Cité Antique. Livre III, Ch. III.

² Od. XVII, 219-28: 376-77: Od. XVIII, 1 ff.: 362-4: 248-9: Od. XXI, 223: 498; Od. XXIV, 397ff. etc.

remain with the rulers. But such ignoble creatures remain an important section of society, and their very weaknesses and defects will, as Plato so clearly saw, continually retard and divert the stream of human development if not duly restrained and guided by some higher authority. In such an aristocratic society the "best men" will have ample field in which to display their excellence. Freed from the sordid necessity of providing for mere material needs, they are in a position to concentrate upon nobler things, and as we have observed, this economic independence did reflect itself in the glorious freedom, the poise, and the sure touch of the Homeric hero. Not that this response to material environment is by any means automatic or inevitable: to rule out the factor of individual initiative is to rob the term "hero" of its content, and incidentally to nullify all human dignity and virtue. But it nevertheless remains true of society as a whole, (with the possible exception of the Christian community and others for the most part ideally conceived) that a certain basis of material well-being is necessary before the good life can become a reality. Material factors remain of cardinal importance¹, and men's philosophy of life reflects the various changes in their physical condition.

When we turn to Hesiod and make the acquaintance of his countrymen it is immediately evident that the entire background of human activity has changed. "Homer and Hesiod stand in strong contrast. The unchecked imagination of the

¹ Cf. Thucydides III, 82: Aristotle. Nic: Eth: 1099b.

Ionic poets, which made light of the contradictions and diversities of legend, differed as widely from the home-keeping, methodical wisdom of the Boeotian peasant, as the brilliant insouciance of their noble audience from the gloomy spirit of the meek hinds and farmers for whom Hesiod's poems were composed"¹. The Homeric chieftain by reason of his physical condition was largely free from fear and worry. He could take much for granted, and concentrate from the very first upon the acquisition of honour and glory. The Boeotian farmer, on the other hand, could never emancipate himself from the "beggary elements"; on every side he was beset by forces beyond his control: his crops, his stock, very life itself, depended less upon his own enterprise than upon the benevolence of strange outside powers which seemed to work independently of human needs or desires.

The social and political background of Hesiod's *Works and Days* would seem to have been the result of those disruptive influences which we discovered already operative in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*². Patriarchal institutions continued to survive in the interest of the landed families, but in opposition to this order other classes gradually substantiated a claim to recognition. The successful struggle of the aristocracy against the king's power resulted in a harsh domination over their dependents. Members of landed families found themselves isolated, tradesmen increased in number, and more unskilled labourers became obliged to enter the service of rich proprietors. The poverty of the soil and the

¹ Theodor Gomperz. *Greek Thinkers*. Vol. I, Bk. I §9.

² *Ibid.* p. 24 //

break-up of the land system played their part in prompting colonization on a grand scale, a movement destined to exercise a profound influence on the character of Greece. But in the wake of this vast movement the old system was struggling to survive, and Hesiod describes the sorry conditions in Boeotia in the Ninth Century B.C., when it seemed that security, justice, and religion had passed away along with all virtues of the "Golden Age"¹.

¹ W. and D., 183 ff: 190 ff: 298 ff: 176 ff. Here again (cf. footnote p. 27) great uncertainty in the matter of time and authorship seems to prevail. But where the problem of freedom is involved we are not bound by such uncertainty. Taking the "Works and Days" and the "Theogony" as they stand, there is discernible a marked development in ideas of moral freedom.

It may well be that the Iliad and the Odyssey were not constructed in anything approaching their present form until the middle of the 9th Century B.C., and that the "Works and Days" was compiled not much later (T.W. Allen. "Homer: Origins and Transmission", Ch. IV), but a marked difference in subject matter, and probably in the age with which the poets are dealing, is manifest. The "Theogony" seems to be later still, and perhaps the work of another poet (Cf. Theog. lines 82 ff.: also T.W. Allen op. cit.), but our thesis is not dependent upon certainty in these matters.

Agriculture tends to affect its devotees adversely in two ways. In the first place, by its precariousness it checks self-assurance. While the Homeric hero with sublime faith and optimism is forever overstepping the limits of his province and learning the rudiments of moral discipline in the harsh school of experience, the tiller of the soil in Hesiod has no desire to live dangerously in order to gain the baubles of glory and honour. He favours the "ca' canny" precept: adventure and enthusiasm are luxuries and prove too costly. The farmer in the presence of nature at work comports himself with studied humility. Such humility need not characterize his attitude to his fellow men, and rarely does; but the exigencies of his economic plight and the extent to which he is working in the dark will render him diffident in asserting any claim to order his own destiny. He is the most religious of men, if "religious" be taken in the Roman sense of "scrupulous". The Pandora myth (W. and D., 48-105) gives religious sanction to this fearful humility. Man must not strive to become too clever. Intellectual activity is

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disastrous, and human willfulness leads to human destruction. The error of Prometheus was substantially the same as the sin of Adam, and both entailed the same baneful consequences.

In such an agricultural economy nature seems to speak of some universal order. No natural object exists in isolation; its function is determined by the need of the whole. Nature is in some sense a community: all its members are called upon to play a part, and separately owe their health to the health of the whole. Thus it behoves a man living under such conditions, not to strike out an independent course, not to set himself up against nature of which he is only a part, but to discipline and humble himself and seek to learn his limitations and his duties, to "number his days that he may apply his heart unto wisdom". Knowledge of nature's laws, and hence of oneself as a part of nature, is of vital importance in such a society. In communion with nature her secrets are revealed, and hence arise the first rules and regulations for the performance of seasonal tasks. Man thus seeks to identify himself with the order of nature; but owing to the awakening of individual and social conscience this order has to be a moral order. That there may be conflict between the natural and the moral soon becomes apparent, and, as will be shown later, considerable ingenuity is called for in reconciling the two¹. "For the son of Cronos has ordained this law for men, that fishes and beasts and winged fowls should devour one another, for right ($\deltaίκη$) is not in

¹ Evidence of this view in Hesiod will be cited at a later stage. It suggests the Platonic doctrine of the State as an organism, in which the functions of individual members are prescribed by the needs of the whole. The same idea is seen in the myth alleged to have been used by Menenius Agrippa (Livy II, 35) to persuade the Roman plebs to return from the Sacred Mount.

them; but to mankind he gave right which proves far the best."

While such a point of view results in an extreme obscurantism, it nevertheless has its brighter side. It is to some such condition that the famous maxim "nothing in excess" (*μηδὲν ἄλλαν*), itself the very hall-mark of Greek civilization, must owe its origin. This attitude of extreme caution, this pedestrian morality, which in Hesiod's day brought with it its own unpretentious rewards, was to shine forth eventually as the very condition of the good life, and of everything "artistic" which went to compose the good life, when Greek civilization came to its full stature.

The second adverse effect of agriculture upon man is in a manner complementary to the first. While his struggle for life and close association with the powerful and mysterious forces of nature discourage enterprising originality of thought or action, and put a premium upon caution, the very conditions of his work render such enterprise impossible or at least very difficult of attainment. Hard manual toil in the open air requires so great an expenditure of energy that, apart from such homely wisdom as is necessary for the effective performance of the task at hand, there results for the most part a suspension of mental activity. For the farmer a change of work is in no sense a rest: refreshment only comes from complete cessation.

Small wonder then that the general outlook is so restricted and essentially practical. "Evil can be got easily and in abundance: the road to her is smooth, and she lives very near us. But between us and Virtue the gods have placed the sweat

of our brows: long and steep is the path that leads to her, and it is rough at the first: but when a man has reached the top, then is she easy to reach, though before she was hard." (W. and D., 287-292). "Both gods and men are angry with a man who lives idle" (W. and D., 303-4). "For the gods keep hidden from men the means of life. Else you would easily do work enough in a day to supply you for a full year without working" (W. and D., 42-44). "Work is no disgrace, but idleness is" (W. and D., 311). This is little more than the gospel of hard work, and by itself has a stultifying effect upon those who uphold it¹. To a life thus controlled there is no direction and little possibility of growth: there is also an imperviousness to the inroads of doubt and anxiety, so that it often comes to be chosen even in an era of greater enlightenment by those for whom the problems of life are too difficult and perplexing.

The religion of the Boeotian landworker is at bottom a cult of nature. "When first you be in ploughing, pray to Zeus of the Earth and to pure Demeter to make Demeter's holy grain sound and heavy." These nature deities exercise ultimate control, and as man becomes more conscious of the great uncertainty of his livelihood, his spirit will be further checked and ultimately enslaved. There is, it is true, a field for human activity. By careful observation of the manner in which nature works, he may aid the process. Nevertheless, while one may

¹ This was the faith to which Cato the Censor dedicated himself afresh in the 2nd Century B.C. Fortunately Rome's gradual development, a slow and extremely painful process at first, was, owing to external influences, already an established fact.

plant and another water, it is God who gives the increase. Under such conditions man tends to become servile and will be prevented from attaining that independence and freedom which are indispensable to true dignity and poise.

There is always the risk, moreover, in such close affinity with nature, that liberation from necessity be sought by means of magic. From some such pseudo-scientific deduction as that "like produces like" there seems to result a measure of control over natural processes, and it is easy to allow this apparent control to obscure the actual enslavement which stifles all enlightenment. And there are some signs that Hesiod's countrymen entered this cul-de-sac. "Whoever crosses a river with hands unwashed of wickedness, the gods are angry with him and bring trouble upon him afterwards. Never put the ladle upon the mixing-bowl at a wine party, for malignant ill-luck is attached to that. When building a house do not leave it rough-hewn, or a sawing crow may settle on it and croak. Take nothing to eat or to wash with from uncharmed pots, for in them there is mischief. Do not let a boy of twelve years sit on things which may not be moved" (W. and D. 725-761). Such injunctions suggest that occult control of nature which is the essence of magic, and the same phenomenon may be observed in the long catalogue of lucky and unlucky days (W. and D. 765-821).

In this connection it is interesting to note Hesiod's use, no doubt quite common at the time, of paraphrase or kenning. The octopus or cuttle is called the Boneless One *ἀνόστος* (W. and D., 524). An old man walking with a staff is called the Three-legged One, *τρίπους ἄσπυρος* (W. & D. 533).

A snail is referred to as the House-carrier, *ὄστρεοφόρος* (W. and D., 571); a robber as the Day-sleeper *ἡμεροκόπος* (W. and D., 605); and an ant as the Wise One ¹ *σοφίς*. Such a device may of course be merely playful. On the other hand it may point to that "universal condition in which puzzles and enigmas are the most comprehensive form under which men see life, and the most satisfying outlet for their emotions and aspirations."² In this case such practice would be the forerunner of those figures used by the priestess at Delphi, and by Heraclitus, to indicate the mystery of truth and the poverty of language, and, "si parva licet componere magnis", point ultimately to the noble use of myth by Plato. At the same time it is tempting to connect this usage with that apotropaic euphemism by means of which primitive peoples were careful to avoid uttering the name of awe-inspiring or terrible objects.³ This would suggest an origin embedded in the thought

¹ Just as to-day the dragon-fly is called the Devil's Darning-needle; certain flowers, Love in the Mist, Lords and Ladies, etc.

² H. V. Routh. *Cod, Man, and Epic Poetry*. Even to-day simple country folk often speak and think in terms of conundrums and proverbs. It is as though they have neither the mental equipment nor the vocabulary to express clearly what they dimly feel.

³ For example, the Black Sea, full of unknown terrors, was originally called the Euxine (*εὐξείνως* - kind to strangers), in the expectation that such a form of flattery would avert evil. In the same way the Furies were referred to as the Kindly Ones (*Εὐμενίδες* or *Ἐμνίδαι*), in the belief that their evil influence would thus be forestalled. "Abstain from words of evil omen" (*εὐφραστία*) was the injunction given to men on solemn occasions.

and practice of magic.

It must however be pointed out that the foregoing examples in the Works and Days are really cases of taboo, the sort of practice which persists in every age. Taboo is after all only a negative form of magic, and while it may constitute an obstacle to human enlightenment, it is never so dangerous as that more positive kind which claims for the medicine man special power to manipulate the power of nature as he wills. Such voodoo must rob men of all freedom in thought or action, and of this evil there is no evidence in Hesiod. Indeed, far from conniving at magical beliefs, it is greatly to the poet's credit that he prevented such a condition arising by insisting that there is an order, natural or divine, or perhaps both, which may be apprehended and according to which the human race may attain freedom. This idea of freedom as inseparable from law was dimly perceived in Homer but receives real impetus in Hesiod. By reading morality into nature, and by further subordinating fairness and justice in the social world to the general conception of justice as the law of Zeus, Hesiod sets up an ideal standard of "right" which was henceforth to govern the display and effective working of "might". This doctrine remained of fundamental importance in the interplay between religio-philosophic and political ideas throughout the course of Greek history.

It is of course a mistake to assume that the morality of nature, or rather the morality of God working through nature, is an idea fully formulated in Hesiod. As has been previously stated, the current religion of his day was at

bottom a ~~mystical~~ cult of nature, and morality consisted in conforming to nature's ways. But it is none the less certain that the poet was seeking to co-ordinate religion and morality more closely, to lift both to a higher plane, and to give both a transcendental sanction, a process rendered less difficult by reason of the easy mutability of Olympian godhead.

The cult of nature accompanied by a pragmatic morality will under favourable conditions answer man's spiritual needs as long as he clings to the soil. When things go wrong, however, he has recourse to other expedients. Sometimes the defects of the economic system of which he forms a part, and the hardships which he is obliged to endure, are regarded as divine visitations calling for a more meticulous performance of religious rites. In some way or other he becomes out of tune with the harmony of nature, and his reinstatement seems to depend upon a more scrupulous observance of religious requirements¹. The silver race, we learn, (W. and D., 128 ff.) "lived only for a little time, and that in sorrow, because of their foolishness, for they could not keep from sinning and wronging one another, nor would they serve the immortals, nor sacrifice on the holy altars of the blessed ones as it is right for men to do wherever they dwell. Then Zeus the son of Cronos was angry and

¹ The punctiliousness of early Roman religious practice, as applied first of all to agriculture, and then to military and political activities, is well known. The visit of the Cretan soothsayer Epimenides to Attica at the close of the Seventh Century B.C. (as related by Plutarch, Solon II, and Aristotle, Ath. Pol. I, 1, 3) is an instance of men seeking to extricate themselves from an economic quagmire by a religious will-o'-the-wisp.

Such an instinct has justification insofar as religious belief and practice have some relation to morality, and morality is the fundamental point at issue between oppressors and oppressed.

put them away, because they would not give honour to the blessed gods who live on Olympus." The iron race encountered trouble and sorrow continuously because it "knew not the fear of the gods" (W. and D. 187). In this connection should also be considered the careful observance of the seasons, involving propitiation of the nature deities. "Pray to Zeus of the Earth and to pure Demeter to make Demeter's holy grain sound and heavy, when first you begin ploughing. . . . In this way your corn-ears will bow to the ground with fulness if the Olympian himself gives a good result at the last. . . . If you plough at the time of the solstice you will gather a thin crop. . . . The will of Zeus is different at different times and it is hard for mortal men to tell it" (W. and D. 465 ff.). It is not a question of man setting himself up against nature with a view to conquering her, nor, with the consciousness of his own power, of developing a painstaking technique in order to outwit her. He appears not to have been conscious of himself to this extent. In his abysmal ignorance he merely felt that he played some part in the community of nature. In some manner his welfare lay in conformity, and agriculture, which provided the necessities of life, was really a ritual, a meticulous performance of certain rites at the proper time in order that the desired end might in due course come about. Simple rules for the performance of seasonal tasks were thus religious ordinances. There is no rational justification for the distinction between lucky and unlucky days (W. and D. 775-821). Such rules do not indicate experiential wisdom built up inductively; behind them lies the religious idea of

observance rather than the scientific idea of observation. Disaster inevitably followed when the message of Zeus, Arcturus, Orion, or the Pleiades was disregarded or imperfectly apprehended, - that is, when the ritual which they called for was not observed.

Even a homely maxim such as "Never dare to taunt a man with deadly poverty which cuts out the heart, for it is sent by the deathless gods" (W. and D. 717) carries with it the idea of religion violated. The ritual of pouring a libation to Zeus (W. and D. 735) must be performed in a proper manner in order to be effective. "Sacrifice to the deathless gods purely and cleanly, and burn rich meats also, and at other times propitiate them with libations and incense, both when you go to bed and when the holy light has come back, that they may be gracious to you in heart and spirit" (W. and D. 336-40). Such a form of conduct is rooted in superstition and fear, and offers no solution of the difficulty which it purports to combat. But the attempt to cure social and economic ills by means of scrupulous observance of religious requirements is not to the fore in Hesiod. It appeared from time to time even during the splendid years of Athenian enlightenment¹, and for long maintained a strangle hold on intellectual development in Rome². But from the small part that it plays in Hesiod we may infer that the poet himself had largely turned his back upon such panaceas. He favours a much more energetic handling of social problems.

¹ Thuc. I, 8: I, 129-34: III, 104: V, 1.

² Livy, XXI, 63.

At other times, when conditions seem unfavourable and life is grim, men in such a setting will consider the fault as somehow lying in themselves. The old ethics and morality will be re-examined, and in the course of such recension, greater emphasis will be laid upon the factor of social utility. It will seem that for the community as a whole, honesty on the part of its members is the best policy. But such a semi-rational basis for public conduct can seldom stand the test of adversity. In times of economic stress human passion grows strong and tends to sweep aside saner considerations. Hence morality must be strengthened if it is to fulfil its function. The most effective reinforcement seems to be divine sanction. In the first place men claim to desire a sympathetic relation between human conduct and the process of nature. This is easy at first, as long as primitive instincts are alone considered; but a further search for some reflection of moral ideals, ideals of justice and mercy, meets with little success. But the moralist is not to be deterred at this stage. He must at all costs maintain his association with nature, for experience and tradition suggest that he is part of it: consequently he proceeds to objectify his idealism in theology, making all nature, of which he is a part, the expression of divine energy and purpose. 'Appearances' will be 'saved' if possible, but their violation will not cause undue alarm: the social conscience must be saved at all costs; and social necessity seems to demand an universal moral order. The lengths to which subsequent Greek thinkers were carried in this attempt to read morality into nature (not always prompted by social necessity

of course) is well known .

It may be objected that such "unscientific" thinking does not make for human enlightenment; that the doctrines evolved could be disproved by reference to facts; that such philosophy is mere wish-fulfilment, dictated by human needs, and consequently unsound. Admittedly it lacked the independence and detachment of later scientific thought: it was a gospel rather than a philosophy; but in spite of this it may rightly claim some measure of respect. Justice was for Hesiod a social necessity, hence he proposed to make it a metaphysical reality. He was a creator and this his creation. He revolted from those slavish and static doctrines that imprison the soul, and claimed that human effort (in this case his) was to some extent capable of ordering human destiny. To this extent he is at one with his heroic predecessors in an energetic approach to the problems of life, showing an original and truly creative spirit. There is a remarkable depth and extent in his reflection, and an extraordinary advance shown in the determination of moral ideas. He is moreover no mere academic, content with skilful analysis of

¹ For instance, in the Republic of Plato, Thrasymachus is represented as justifying his principle of justice on the basis of nature (Rep. Bk. II, 338c ff.). The only way in which the conduct of men differs from that of beasts is that it is characterized by greater foresight and cunning. Justice is merely the "will of the stronger". This implied view of human nature, however, is not acceptable to Socrates. But it is interesting to note that in attempting to formulate a more enlightened definition of justice Socrates still seeks to discover its source in nature. Public morality is the outward manifestation of one's desire and ability to observe the limits of his nature: it consists in doing one's job, or minding one's own business (Rep. Bk. IV, 427 to end).

² Consider the Perses theme, which underlies the entire Works and Days.

social ills, and tentative suggestions for their cure: he thunders forth doctrines seasoned with denunciatory prophecy and manifests all the passionate eloquence of a Jeremiah (W. and D., 180-201).

At this point some clarification of our treatment of Hesiod is called for. We endeavoured to shew at the outset (p. 32 ff.) that physical conditions in Boeotia in the Ninth Century B.C. to a large extent governed the nature of human beliefs and practices. But we must remember that Hesiod was less subject to these influences than the majority of his contemporaries. His father, a native of Cyme in Aeolis, had in early life been a sea-faring trader, but was eventually forced by poverty to leave his native place. Thence he proceeded to Greece where a new home was established at Asera near Thespiæ in Boeotia (W. and D. 656 ff.). It is uncertain whether the two sons, Hesiod and Perses, were born in Cyme or in Asera, but in either case the family tradition exercised a strong influence over them. Perses was evidently infected by the restlessness and unscrupulous ambition which from earliest times characterized peoples of the Aegean seaboard. Hesiod, familiar with the fatal lure of trading, favoured the quieter and more simple joys of rural life. His antipathy to sea-faring and trade resulted from the unfortunate experiences of his family in Aeolis; but it was also from his family associations in Ionia that the poet derived that general knowledge and literary ability which, combined with his own experience in continental Greece, enabled him to deal so effectively with the specific problems of Boeotian agriculture.

Attention has already been drawn to the primitive beliefs

and practices which obtained in Boeotia. That animistic religion, supplemented by a careful but superficial morality, constitutes the background against which Hesiod's work stands out in bold relief. His religion is no mere placation of nature deities, nor is his morality disjointed and haphazard: he is not oppressed by tradition and superstition, and although in his wisdom he made full use of the religious framework of his day, the central figures were altered almost beyond recognition. He gave order and perspective to human thought, and sought to vindicate man's claim to a proper measure of independence and dignity.

A study of Hesiod's method in dealing with the moral problems of his day is essential if we would understand the gradual crystallization of ideas of freedom. Liberty, in the political sense, has no place in his scheme of thought, but his moral philosophy shows clearly the extent to which moral freedom is called into question. We may proceed to elicit from the *Works and Days* some indication of the development for which Hesiod was responsible; that is, of the movement from an animistic religion and work-a-day morality to a more coherent and intelligent view of man in relation to his universe.

There are abundant examples of that popular wisdom which finds such a fertile field in agricultural communities. At the very beginning of his poem Hesiod relates the allegory of the two Strifes, the one "fostering evil war and battle", the other "stirring up even the sniftless to toil" and infusing them with ambition (*W. and D.* 11-26). Thus is illustrated the point that human spirit or energy is of itself neither good nor bad: it may be either, according to ^{the} bias. The

notion of law and order as regulating and giving proper effectiveness to human activity is at once introduced. Virtue, we learn, brings its own material rewards (230-237), while violence and cruelty entail material penalties (238-247). It is easy to see that justice and virtue are desirable in a community if the common weal be sought; but it is more difficult to answer the contention of Plato's Thrasymachus that for the individual, if only he is sufficiently clever, the best policy is dishonesty. Even the introduction of "Far-seeing Zeus" who "ordains the punishment" and brings about a heavy requital for ill-gotten gain (333), fails to carry conviction. Neighbourliness pays, we are told (342-351); but how weak a doctrine this is, and how faulty the human psychology which it assumes, is quite apparent. Man can never think merely in terms of a "good bargain"¹.

"If you speak evil, you yourself will soon be worse spoken of" (721). "Avoid the talk of men. For Talk is mischievous, light, and easily raised, but hard to bear and difficult to be rid of. Talk never wholly dies away when many people voice her: even Talk is in some ways divine" (760-764). Slander acts as a boomerang and its antics are governed by a kind of rough justice. But such prudential maxims (Cf. also 710 ff.) evidently proved incapable of controlling the factor in society which they ignored, namely human passion; and the purely human motive of utility is gradually supplanted by one of divine sanction or obligation.

¹ In the Funeral Speech Pericles urges his fellow-citizens to let love (*Épous*) fill their hearts, since it alone can prompt right conduct (Thuc. II, 43). The "do ut des" attitude is represented as having its true place in Sparta, the home of obscurantism (Thuc. II, 39).

Before this ultimate is reached, however, there are signs that human justice seeks its authority in laws of nature. "Neither famine nor disaster ever haunts men who do true justice; but light-heartedly they tend the fields which are all their care. The earth bears them victual in plenty, and on the mountains the oak bears acorns upon the top and bees in the midst. Their woolly sheep are laden with fleeces; and their women bear children like their parents" (250-257). Such is the response of nature to human justice, hence the principle of justice must apply to nature itself. But this universal doctrine does not work, and when such perfect harmony breaks down, as is inevitable from the outset, there is a tendency to complain with the Stoics that nature is imperfectly apprehended, or with the Christians that man's knowledge of God is at fault. Hesiod follows this latter course. "Work", *Perseus* is told, "that Hunger may hate you, and venerable Demeter richly crowned may love you and fill your barn with food" (299-301). "Let it be your care to order your work properly, that in the right season your barns may be full of victual" (305-307). *Perseus* must meet nature on her own terms and he will succeed; but careful observance of nature's ways, while implying a certain orderliness, hardly finds a place for that more enlightened human morality which Hesiod sought to establish. Similarly (cf. 384 ff.), watching for the Pleiades to rise before beginning harvest, and for their setting before beginning to plough, denotes a certain order of nature, but order or consistency of such a kind by no means satisfies man's ideals. He must transcend nature if he desires

to find perfect justice. "For the son of Cronos has ordained this law for men, that fishes and beasts and winged fowls devour one another, for right is not in them; but to mankind he gave right which proves far the best. For whoever knows the right and is ready to speak it, far-seeing Zeus gives him prosperity." At this point we see that Hesiod is lifting the whole problem out of its earthly setting. If man wants to discover that law in obedience to which he may find perfect freedom, he must shake off the trammels of earthly things and create it for himself. Hence the more precise determination of moral ideas gives rise to the need for an adequate theology.

Where then shall wisdom and justice be found? Hesiod and Perses must settle their dispute with true judgment, "which is of Zeus and perfect" (35-36). Such justice is something which disregards the accidents of time and place: it is a divine law and universally applicable. Former ages have fallen upon this rock and have been broken. The silver age (121 ff.) failed to live according to the law of true justice and gave not Zeus his due. The bronze men burnt themselves out in a spirit of immoderation; while the present age, the iron men, hold might to be right (189), have no place for reverence or shame (192 ff.), and in consequence must fall upon destruction. They drive Aidōs and Nemesis out (200), and failing to observe due moderation they cannot see "how much more the half is than the whole" (40). The fable of the hawk and the nightingale (205-212) declares the law of the jungle: man is a fool not to see that there is a higher law of Zeus. "Observe due measure: proportion is

best in all things" (93-94). Zeus is not only just, but he has the power to enforce his just decrees. "For easily he gives strength, and easily he humbles the strong. Easily he diminishes the conspicuous and exalts the obscure. Easily he straightens the crooked and withers up the arrogant." Justice tracks down her enemies. "Justice beats outrage when she comes at length to the end of the race." "Oath keeps pace with wrong judgments" (217 ff.). "For upon the bounteous earth Zeus has thrice ten thousand spirits, watchers of mortal men, and these keep watch on judgments and deeds of wrong as they roam, clothed in mist, over all the earth. And there is virgin Justice, the daughter of Zeus, who is honoured and revered among the gods who dwell on Olympus, and whenever anyone hurts her with lying slander, she sits beside her father and tells him of men's wicked heart, until the people pay for the mad folly of their princes who, evil minded, pervert judgment and give sentence crookedly" (249 ff.). It is noticeable that much is said of Justice the daughter of Zeus. We hear nothing of those Prayers of Penitence, daughters of great Zeus, who introduce a note of mercy into the Iliad. In Hesiod Justice is the daughter whose violation causes Zeus to visit sure and certain judgment upon the heads of her betrayers. God is the relentless judge, the god of Boeotian puritanism.

Yet it must also be remarked that in Hesiod, as in Homer, there is no indication of the jealous god. Insolence, that propensity for transgressing due measure, brings punishment, it is true; but such punishment is not capricious; it is moral. It is according to a rule laid down; and being

constitutional it allows of human freedom. Such a doctrine of divine justice and retribution will exercise a firm and stabilizing influence on society. Complications will arise, however, when retributive punishment is prolonged or delayed and is visited, as sometimes happens, upon innocent persons. If the children's teeth are set on edge because their fathers have eaten sour grapes, then human freedom is very seriously called into question. This problem of the inherited curse did not arise for Hesiod. For its specific formulation and attempted solution we must wait for Aeschylus.

It is thus seen that Hesiod's theology and moral philosophy arise out of the needs of his day. He is not a disinterested student, but rather a fervent propagandist with passionate feeling for the ills of society, and a sure premonition of the disaster that will follow unless those ills are cured. Hence the doctrines evolved constitute in reality a formula of moral government and should be tested by the touchstone of empirical efficacy. From the conflicting beliefs and chaotic conditions of the Ninth Century Hesiod did reclaim a measure of dignity and freedom for men within the limits of law, and although his work was necessarily tentative and temporary it nevertheless marked a definite and important stage in the development of Greek thought.

There will come a time, however, when such a rule of life fails to function. Hesiod's *Works and Days* fulfil human needs very well under an agricultural economy. But during the Eighth and Seventh Centuries Greece entered upon a period of rapid expansion. Colonies were planted on the shores of Thrace

and the Black Sea, in Italy and Sicily, even in Spain and Gaul. The growth of trade was the most important fact of the time and the liberalism of colonial life reacted upon the mother states. This tendency is already apparent in the Works and Days and draws from Hesiod a protest natural to one in his condition (W. and D. 630 ff.). But the increase in prosperity was not common to the whole of Greece. Purely agricultural communities like Boeotia¹ were unable to participate in the new wealth. At such times in history landowners are unwilling to accept the modest returns of agriculture. They vie with their more wealthy neighbours, and agriculture is bled white in a vain attempt to exact returns which only commerce and industry can yield². Oppression is bound to follow. Conditions become so bad for the majority of landworkers that all human efforts seem unavailing, defeatism sets in, and men become impotent and slavish. The time is not ripe for grappling with such problems by purely human means. The force of habit and tradition, the social ethos, is still too strong, and men tend to take refuge in a religion of spiritual compensations, a philosophy of retreat.

The Theogony seems to have been composed at least a century after Hesiod's Works and Days, and it is generally considered in connection with the vast growth of trade and maritime enterprise in the Eighth Century. Such a movement would be accompanied by the extension of knowledge, and there would

¹ Cf. also the condition of Attica before Solon.

² Cf. the gift-devouring princes (W. and D. 264).

naturally arise the desire, by simplification and elimination of inconsistencies, to unify the numerous theogonies and cosmogonies which held favour in the various localities. It has been stated that the author of the Theogony is interested in myths for their own sake, as a subject of knowledge, and that his work is already in a manner scientific since his object is universality and simplicity¹. Such a statement is of course true. The gradual formation of physical mythology in particular, with its careful attempt to find a common foundation of things, and its stress upon relationships, seems to be leading up to the more rational efforts of the physical philosophers. But it would also appear that the poem, proceeding as it does from the Boeotian School, reflects a yet more vital and indigenous condition. It seems to take up the theme of the Works and Days, 165 ff., where Hesiod says "Father Zeus gave to the other heroes a living and an abode apart from men, and made them dwell at the ends of the earth. And they live untouched by sorrow in the islands of the blessed along the shore of the deep-swirling Ocean, happy heroes for whom the grain-giving earth bears honey-sweet fruit flourishing throughout the year." Here is a world of the imagination in which a man may live for a time and forget the unpleasant things of earth. The opening verses of the Theogony take the poet to that other world of Mount Helicon, where the Muses dance their measures and for ever hymn the glorious immortals. They bid him sing (31) of the "race of the blessed gods that are eternally".

¹ Leon Robin. Greek Thought. Ch. II: J. Burnet. E.G.P. Intr. §IV: Glotz and Cohen. Histoire Grecque, Tome 1^{er}, Ch. V.

"These Muses did memory bear of union with the father, the son of Cronos, a forgetting of ills and a rest from sorrow" (53-55). "Their hearts are set upon song and their spirit free from care, a little way from the topmost peak of snowy Olympus. There are their bright dancing-places and beautiful homes, and beside them the Graces and Desire live in delight." From this display of poetry we picture an ideal world in marked contrast with the sordid and distressing conditions of earthly life. "Though a man have sorrow and grief in his newly-troubled soul, and live in dread because his heart is distressed, yet when a singer, a servant of the Muses, chants the glorious deeds of men of old and the blessed gods who inhabit Olympus, at once he forgets his heaviness, and remembers not his sorrows at all; but the gifts of the goddesses soon turn him away from these." (Theog. 98 ff.). "Earth brought forth the long Hills, graceful haunts of the goddess-nymphs who dwell amongst the glens" (Theog. 131 ff.). Behind this representation of a happy and carefree existence, so different from sordid reality, we seem to detect the protest of an oppressed and despondent people. Life held out little hope, and the sufferers were ready to seek compensation elsewhere

This aspect of the Theogony must not be laboured, but the tendency to seek compensations not of this world is undoubtedly there. The Theogony is thus especially interesting since we have presented to us the two diverging lines of development along which men were to travel. On the one hand there is the method of grappling with human problems in a human way. The moral reflection of the Works and Days and the cosmic reflection

of the Theogony undoubtedly point forward to the rise of rationalistic thought in philosophy and politics. On the other hand the defeatists will find ample scope for their inclinations amidst the intricacies of Orphism and the mystery religions.

CHAPTER IIITHE POLITICAL SOLUTION TO A PRACTICALDIFFICULTY: SOLON AND THEOGNIS

In Homer *ἄδως* and *ἄεπας* indicate the characteristic Greek tendency to preserve the value of personality and freedom avoiding at the same time both excessive regimentation and offensive individualism. The term "barbarian" may have taken its form originally from the apparent gibberish spoken by foreign peoples, but it soon came to stand for the disordered license or the slavish obedience which differentiated their manner of living from the more civilized life of Greece¹. Notwithstanding this early promise however, moral and political ideas crystallized very slowly. The hero dimly perceived that he stood in need of certain principles of conduct, but society had not yet reached that degree of organization and development which could lift responsibility from the shoulders of the individual and legislate in the interests of the community as a whole. There are, indeed, general rules of public behaviour involved, but as has already been observed², they seem to be for the most part a reflection of those principles which were evolved by the individual in answer to his own spiritual needs and based upon his own personal experience. At that early stage, law, moral and political, is not primarily restrictive or prohibitive: it provides rather an extensive framework within which personality can find most satisfactory expression. Hence

¹ Vid. Herod. II, 57: Aristotle. Pol., I, 6, 6.

² Chapter I, page 21

there is no contradiction between *φύσις* and *νόμος* .

But the dangers implicit in such an elastic and imperfectly formulated view become fully apparent when the strain of adverse physical conditions is added. In Boeotia of the ninth century B.C. Hesiod found it impracticable for individuals to construct their own code of morality. Moreover, the primitive religious practices and prudential maxims of the day could no longer meet human requirements, hence arose the need for a reformation in the realm of moral values. While law and justice were still considered in a manner guides to fuller life, the real emphasis was changed from the positive to the negative aspect, and the function of law became primarily protective¹. Thus Hesiod formulated his "perfect law of Justice". This law naturally had to receive some authority; but political power, because of its general abuse, and possibly also because it was unattainable by those who wished to regulate, it was looked upon as essentially evil. In consequence, Hesiod had recourse to theology to provide the requisite sanction.

By the end of the seventh century, however, it became apparent to all that insufficient attention had been given to the factor of power. Justice and law have little significance apart from the means of enforcing them, and the compelling power of religion is at all times dependent upon particular environmental conditions. The liberalizing influences of

¹ At this point we have the first indication in Greek history of the contract theory of the state, fully enunciated later by Glaucon and Adeimantus in Book II of the Republic. It expresses the protest of the less competent majority, and underlies all the excesses of Athenian democracy.

commerce and learning, the diminution of economic fear, were bound to render the old sanctions null and void. The economic and political factors which in Hesiod's day had given rise to grave disorder in Boeotia subsequently became more pronounced, until by the seventh century B.C. most states in Greece were called upon to choose between the "gift-devouring princes" and some hope of ensuring a fairer distribution of property and privilege. Monarchy had practically disappeared as a form of government, and the Eupatrids gradually came to monopolize magisterial office as well as the administration of justice and the ownership of land¹. But colonization, which enabled the landless and political malcontents to achieve a greater measure of independence in other lands, also exercised a repercussive influence upon life in the older communities. Opposition to oppression did not continue passive, nor was it content to find solace in religious hope. Commerce and industry grew apace as colonization opened up the recesses of the Mediterranean, and those who made use of the new opportunities invariably strove to break down the old order which hampered free development. They refused to accept the old lines of social cleavage and became energetic leaders of revolt against an aristocracy whose real title to respect and privilege had diminished as its power had increased. Little betterment could be looked for while justice was administered by an interested few; for with the nobles we are told², "rested the teaching of the laws and the inter-

¹ Plut. Theseus, 25, 3: Aristotle. Politics II, 7 ff.: Ath. Pol. II ff.

² Plut. Theseus, 25, 2.

pretation of the will of Heaven". Hence arose the general demand for the establishment of a body of rules, defining the rights of the individual, and requiring conformity on the part of all.

In most cases it appears that the work of codification was agreed to by both factions in the state, and that the task was committed to an aegymaste, who, by his moderation, showed special aptitude in reconciling conflicting interests. But the change in the administration of justice was not always brought about in so peaceful and reasonable a manner. Violent and prolonged opposition on the part of the Eupatrids frequently resulted in revolution. In communities where the people were numerous and strong enough to organize, and where industrial and commercial activity quickened their interests¹, there would appear popular champions who would, if necessary, discard all traditional methods, and proceed to their objective by force. The tyrants were enemies of aristocratic privilege, and relied ultimately upon the strong arm to maintain their position. But since the authority of tyranny rested upon force and political intrigue, in Greece it could never be more than a temporary expedient until such time as public opinion could become articulate. The proper relationship between power and service, duty and privilege, coercion and consent, had yet to be determined. Not that tyranny was entirely negative and destructive in its aims, for it brought about the stability which was so necessary if democratic tendencies were to develop. But by imposing peace

¹ Vid. Thuc. I, 13.

and bringing prosperity to the community, the tyrant was encouraging an attitude of mind which inevitably brought about his own downfall.

The history of one city-state during the later seventh century offers especially eloquent testimony to the crisis which confronted all Greece at this juncture, varying, of course, as to time and intensity according to particular environmental conditions. In some ways the position of Attica at this time was similar to that of Boeotia in Hesiod's day. She had, for the most part, remained agricultural owing to the nature of her geography; and had failed to keep pace with neighbouring states such as Aegina, Megara, and Corinth, whose circumstances had prompted them to apply themselves to trade in order to make good the deficiencies of agriculture. Various moves had been made during the course of the century to deal with the problems that threatened corporate life. In the first place, the institution of the six *Thesmothetae* for the purpose of recording judicial decisions and guarding them in the interests of justice¹ marked a distinct advance upon the old system which was haphazard in the extreme and allowed of no appeal. But these guardians of the laws were elected annually from among the *Eupatridae*; hence we may conjecture that they would hardly be prejudiced in favour of the lower classes. Indicative of the prevailing unrest was the effort of Cylon² to establish tyranny in Athens. The drastic counter-measures adopted by the archon *Melesias* involved an already impoverished

¹ Ath. Pol. III, 4-5.

² Herod. V, 71: Thuc. I, 126: Ath. Pol. Ch. I ff.

state in war with its wealthy neighbour Megara¹, and with the expulsion of the Alcmaeonidae the popular cause suffered a further set-back. There followed a religious purification of the city by Epimenides², but disorder continued, and finally Draco was commissioned to codify the laws. Whatever the merit of his work, - and he seems to have done much to bring private feuds between families under the jurisdiction of the state - the fundamental social and economic problems remained untouched. The greed and oppression of the landed class continued unabated, and the people who depended upon the soil for their livelihood³ found it impossible to continue under the existing laws of debt. Yet Attica's very poverty was a blessing in disguise, providing as it did the most unsuitable milieu for a tyrant. The deep-rooted agricultural tradition resulted in a certain popular mood, fundamentally conservative, which rejected the rash expedient of tyranny. Even in the face of such emergencies as the Sacred War, the aggression of Megara with Salamis as the bone of contention, and the economic crisis which threatened from within, the people of Attica seem to have looked to some constitutional method of solving their difficulties which would preserve for them a measure of freedom, independence, and responsibility. There were, of course, extremists who had little regard for common justice and the welfare of the whole. Solon says (Fr. 30, 31) he had to "hold the people back", and "check the greed of the leaders" (Fr. 2). But on his own showing he could never have maintained his position

¹ Plut. Solon, 12.

² Ath. Pol. I.

³ Ath. Pol. V

unless supported by a substantial body of moderate opinion.

Solon came forward towards the close of the century admirably equipped in every way to assume leadership in Athens. Of aristocratic family, he had in his youth applied himself to commerce, and in the course of his travels had gained invaluable experience as well as a fortune¹. Upon returning home he drew much attention by his ardent advocacy of unity and expansion. His policy seemed vindicated when Athens regained Salamis¹, and succeeded in holding Sigeum against the Mityleneans². In 594 B.C. he was appointed archon with extraordinary powers³, and we are told that only his good judgment prevented both parties in the state from acclaiming him tyrant. Solon forthwith advanced a remarkable solution of the difficulties that had beset society up to this time. He offered the Athenians a "New Deal" in the form of *eúroμία* - good legislation. The Homeric and Hesiodic views of law were to some extent combined and developed, but the resultant marked an extraordinary advance in social and political thought. On the one hand the positive function of law as a guiding and educative factor was stressed: at the same time it was looked upon as a protective measure, in curbing more brute strength or the merely spirited element, and giving citizens of the State as a whole proper opportunities for expressing more civilized qualities. The balance and moderation characteristic of Solon's thought are at once apparent.

But *eúroμία*, however excellent, cannot be expected to function by itself, nor may its effective working be left to

¹ Plut. Solon, 10.

² Herod. V, 95.

³ Plut. Solon, 14.

the *aidos* or generous instincts of men. Such would prove an utterly unstable foundation. Nor again will it derive its authority from a theology or philosophy which owes its origin to the particular needs of a particular environment. Such a form of law, with the religious feeling to which it owes efficacy, is too static and stubborn. It finds no room for the claims of succeeding generations whose needs become more complex and diversified with modifications in their physical condition. Such law becomes a tyrant, and defeats those very ends for which it was brought into being.

Consequently the legislator will avoid Mounts Sinai and Helicon. With both feet firmly planted on the earth he will consider and evaluate the relative claims of the various interests in the community; by compromise and manipulation he will endeavour to meet such claims and express them in the form of a constitution. An individual's rights will reflect directly the contribution which he makes to the community, and such sovereignty as manifests itself through law will derive ultimately from the general consent.

The fragments of Solon's poems constitute an "agologie pro vita sua". His "res gestae" are embodied in the constitution which he created and in the laws which he made, but from his poems we may elicit the outstanding principles according to which he worked. They reflect the general process of his thought as he addressed himself to the problems with which he was faced.

In the first place we are struck by the new emphasis upon the idea of human responsibility. Reference has already been made to the lack of initiative induced by adverse economic

conditions and by the outlet for human hopes and aspirations found in some ideal world or system of thought¹. The aristocracy in their monopoly of power had naturally encouraged this tendency whole-heartedly. The rise of tyrannies had to some extent broken down the prejudice, showing that while aristocratic privilege might be sacred, it was by no means impregnable. Yet the tyrants were invariably themselves of noble birth, and while in their own interest they curbed the power of the nobles and sought to ameliorate the condition of the oppressed, they depended ultimately upon force and repression. Hence the people had little reason to look upon themselves as responsible persons and potential masters of their political destiny. And while adversity bred much discontent, and a new revolutionary spirit was rampant, there was a marked absence of constructive ideas for social betterment. The power of Themis was waning but *Nomos* had not yet appeared as the principle of cohesion in society.

Solon, however, as a result of his early experience, had been able to adopt a very liberal attitude. So it is not surprising that in his approach to the problems that beset Athens he deemed it necessary to strike the note of human responsibility in no uncertain manner, thus introducing a new era in human relations. "If on our city ruin comes, it will never be by the dispensation of Zeus and the purpose of the blessed immortals, so powerful is our great-hearted guardian, born of mighty sire, Pallas Athene, who holds over it her hands. It is the people themselves who in their folly seek to destroy

¹ Cf. p.

our great city, prompted by desire for wealth" (Fr. 2). That is to say, the people must not imagine that the ills they suffer are to be attributed to the purpose of the Immortals. Great-hearted Athens is powerful and makes the city her special care. Proper understanding, however, comes only from an understanding of the strictly human aspect of their troubles. Some people are willing to bring ruin upon the city for the sake of wealth; unjust leaders are in the grip of arrogance and greed, and in their folly are rendering intolerable the lot of the common folk. Now all this disorder results from lawlessness or bad government (*δυσνομία*). Good government (*εὐνομία*), on the other hand, makes all things orderly and perfect. Such is the lesson which Solon's heart bids him teach the Athenians (Fr. 2). It is characteristic of men that they gloat over their vain hopes in gaping folly (Fr. 1a, 36). The wish is too often father to the thought. It is true that "Fate brings mortals both good and ill, and the gifts of the immortal gods must needs be accepted. In every form of activity, moreover, there is risk, and no man can tell when a thing is beginning what way it is destined to take" (Fr. 1a, 63 ff). But that is no excuse for passivity and the fatal sloth that courts oppression. "The city is destroyed of great men, and the common people fall into bondage unto a despot because of ignorance" (Fr. 7). "If the people have grievous suffering through their own fault, they should not blame the gods for it, for they themselves have exalted these men by giving them means of protection; and therefore it is that they have the evil of servitude (Fr. 9: 10).

It would seem that men were called upon to exercise their

initiative to the full within the province of freedom that was clearly assigned to them. Solon in emphasizing human responsibility in this way, struck at the very root of authority as popularly conceived. A custom ordaining certain rules of precedence in the community, by means of which individuals are enabled to aggrandize themselves at the expense of their fellows, is not of itself sacrosanct, and injustices which spell ruin for the state are not attributable to divine will or destiny (Fr. 2, 1 ff). In other words, Solon seeks to rationalize the problem, and such rationalism is most suggestive. There is evident here in germ the first antithesis between *φύσις* and *νόμος*, and Solon in attempting to sweep away the mildewed accretions of former years and in emphasizing the full freedom of men to order their lives independently, if necessary, of the spiritual legacy handed to them at birth, shows himself to be not merely the father of democracy, for that was but incidental: actually he was the pioneer of humanism.

Having made this initial statement concerning the right of men to repudiate outworn expedients and think afresh for themselves, Solon proceeds to follow out the logical consequences of his premise. There had already been ample signs that certain individuals could act upon this principle to the hurt of their fellow men. The tyrants, wielding power for which they made answer to none, found themselves as we learn from Herodotus¹, "outside the pale of the ideas in which they had been trained." They accomplished such, however, in spite

¹ Herod. III, 80.

of Thucydides' explicit statement to the contrary¹, for the social betterment of Greece, in breaking away from established customs and in providing that measure of prosperity which is the pre-requisite of general cultural development. But the fact remains that tyranny depended for its existence on force and repression, and in failing to represent the interests of all it was bound among an energetic people to end in failure. Tyranny, we learn from Aristotle, is "monarchy used for the advancement of the monarch"². Solon, in Fr. 12, 7 ff., indicates that the power of wealth cannot last if it come as a result of unjust works. "Wealth I do desire to possess, but would not have it unrighteously; without fail in after time comes retribution for the works of man's wanton violence endure not for long". Tyranny was no less destructive of harmony than the rule of the extreme oligarchs or the pretensions of disgruntled revolutionaries. Hence it was vitally necessary that someone should see the evil consequences of such a factious condition; and it remained for Solon to preach with so much force the very reasonable doctrine of compromise.

Elementary as this idea at first sight appears, it can never be commonplace, since it is fundamental in all social troubles. Solon himself was the mediator in Athenian disorder, and thus represents in his official capacity the great political doctrine to which he held. He occupied an unenviable position, as we learn from Frs. 30 and 31. "Had I complied with the wishes

1

Thuc. I, 17.

2

Pol. III, 7. 8.

of my opponents then, or at a later time with the design of the other party against them, this city would have been bereaved of many sons. Wherefore I stood at bay, defending myself on every side, like a wolf among a pack of hounds."

In attempting to legislate for the state as a whole he naturally failed to please any particular faction, but in determining the health of the whole it became necessary to define the limits within which individuals might function. This process might appear a curtailment of free activity, but in reality it was the only means by which the group as a whole could enjoy any freedom at all. In Fr. 3, he continues "To the people I have given just as much power as suffices, neither taking away from their due nor offering more; while for those who had power and were honoured for wealth I have taken thought likewise, that they should suffer nothing unseemly. I stand with strong shield flung around both parties, and have allowed neither to win an unjust victory." "Tame the strong will in your hearts, you who have made your way to the enjoyment of lavish prosperity; keep your high thoughts within moderate bounds; for neither shall we yield to you, nor for yourselves will this course prove expedient." (Fr. 27c.) "These things I wrought by main strength, fashioning that blend of force and justice that is law, and I went through to the close as I had promised. And ordinances for noble and base alike I wrote, fitting a rule of jurisdiction straight and true to every man." (Fr. 30, 31).

The idea of compromise is of vital importance in the thought and work of Solon. While people were held enthralled

by a religious belief in the sanctity of existing institutions such advancement in social and political thought was impossible, for there is no compromise with God. It is only when emphasis is laid upon human achievement and the ability of men to order their own destiny, that compromise, flexible and artificial by nature, can come in to navigate rough waters and enable society to maintain a safe course.

Another most impressive feature of Solon's reformation is the orderliness which pervades all his work. He was no mere improvisator dealing with problems in a haphazard manner with a view only to their temporary adjustment. It is true that he deals with men as a group and pays scant attention to the psychology of the individual¹. Such a defect, however, was characteristic of the age in which he lived, and, as we know, remained a defect for a century and a half after his death. The moral tendencies of Solon are invariably political and intimately associated with the idea of *εὐνομία*. Once this is granted, the clear logic of his thought may readily be observed. So far we have seen how he proceeded from a clear enunciation of human responsibility to the principle of compromise in human relations. But he is not content, any more than was Hesiod, to allow public morality to rest upon mere expediency. Unlike Hesiod, however, he sought to discover a sanction that would not depend for its efficacy upon particular conditions in a particular age. Hesiod's moral philosophy, as we have noted, was called into being by the needs of an agricultural community. When other

¹ Fr. 22 suggests, however, that some thought is directed to man as an individual.

factors of trade and commerce, or intellectual enlightenment, entered in, the strain proved too great and left the people morally bankrupt. Solon endeavoured to formulate certain principles of conduct universally applicable, broad political principles which, while owing much to the beliefs and discoveries of the past, were shorn of non-essentials and took on an universal aspect. They differ from the isolated prudential maxims of the chronic poets in that they represent a synthesis, and attempt to "see life steadily and see it whole"

As naturally follows from Solon's emphasis upon human responsibility and the principle of compromise, all devices, both educative and corrective, calculated to foster social life were artificial. Rules and regulations of political life must be man-made to meet specific needs, but in order to command due respect they must also embody an element of universality. They will not be religious in character, nor will there be unreflective acceptance of traditional beliefs and prejudices. Human intellect must be brought to bear upon human relations; human motives and tendencies must be analysed and a rational solution arrived at. Reason is the constant and universal factor which governs all Solon's thought, and his view of law approximates most closely to the Aristotelian definition, "Reason without passion (*νοῦς ἄνευ ὁρέξεως*)"¹. In short Solon was the inventor of political science.

The success of such a method will depend upon men's willingness to accept what is reasonable, and under normal conditions

¹ Politics III, 1287A

this assumption is warranted. There will be numerous occasions when reasonableness ceases to be a criterion: adverse physical conditions may result in emotion dictating policy and general conduct. It nevertheless remains true that reason and the reasonable constitute as it were the thread of normality running through human affairs, and while they never govern human activity completely, they supply that cohesion there is in history.

What was the universal principle which, according to the demands of reason, must guide public life? In Greek thought after the age of the "Wise Men", during the last decades of the seventh century, *γνῶθι σεαυτόν* and *μηδὲν ἄγαν* constitute the two commandments on which hang all the law and the prophecies. Solon's entire programme of reform consists in a general application of the rule "know thyself", and of its counterpart "nothing in excess". The first injunction calls for a clear appreciation of one's ability in relation to one's environment, and the second represents a plea for intelligent application of such knowledge. The people must learn that they have brought servitude upon themselves by their own wrong-headedness (frs. 9, 10). In other words, they have failed to understand the nature of their own power. They must comprehend the true situation and act. But if reason prompts this opposition to injustice, it also rigidly controls it. If reason gives way to passion, then minds become unbalanced, and excess bears arrogance (frs. 4, 5). Hence it is very necessary to discern the hidden measure of wisdom which alone contains the end of all things (fr. 15). It would appear, then, that the mean is intellectually determined, and if one misses the mark, such failure is primarily an error of judgment.

It is evident from the fragments, however, that such moral teaching as was indicated by the injunctions *γνώσις σωτηρίαν* and *σοφία δόξαν* was also expressed at times through a complication of religious ideas. The *ὑβρις-ἄτη* theme appears and warns men against the evils of excess, - "the great pride (*ὑβρις*) of the unrighteous rulers is followed by grievous sufferings; for they know not how to check satiety (*κορος*)" (Fr. 2, 8): "for excess (*κορος*) breeds arrogance (*ὑβρις*) when much prosperity (*εὐχάσος*) follows those whose mind is not perfect" (Fr. 4: 5). In Fr. 12, 13 also we are told that "ruin (*ἄτη*) follows upon the works of insolence (*ὑβρις*)".

At other times a similar lesson is conveyed by the use of terms suggestive of an avenging deity or of the congenital curse. Ruin *ἄτη* is mingled with unrighteous works: "such is the vengeance of Zeus" for injustice (*τοιαύτη Ζηνὸς πέδεται τιμὴ*) (Fr. 12, 25). One pays to-day, another to-morrow; and those who themselves flee and escape the pursuing destiny of Heaven (*ἴδων μόρ' ἐπιούσαν*), to them vengeance always comes again, for the price of their deeds is paid by their innocent children, or else by their seed after them" (Fr. 12, 29 ff). "Possessions are granted to men by the gods, yet from them arises disastrous ruin (*ἄτη*), which one man has now and another then, whensoever Zeus sends it by way of retribution" (Fr. 12, 74). Or Justice is personified - "Justice (*Δίκη*) is well aware of what is and what has been, and soon or late always comes to avenge" (Fr. 2, 15): "Justice always follows upon unrighteous gain" (Fr. 12, 8).

With such passages as these in mind we may question how

far Solon was affected by religious belief. He pays tribute to the gods from time to time - "With God's help (*οὐκ ἴσθ' ἄνθρωπος*) I have done what I said (Fr. 30: 31). He invokes the Muses, daughters of Memory and Olympian Zeus (Fr. 12), and prays to "King Zeus, Son of Cronos, that he bestow good fortune and honour upon these ordinances " (Fr. 36). Athens, he thinks, "will never perish by the destiny of Zeus or the will of the Immortals, - for such is the power of the greathearted guardian Athene, Daughter of a mighty sire" (Fr. 2, 1 ff). He prays that Cypris of the Violet Crown may grant him safe conduct to his native land" (Fr. 18).

But this need mean little more than conventional usage, and it is important to note that his use of the olbos, keros, hybris, ate theme, or of the avenging deity, in order to explain the suffering and disorder consequent upon wrong conduct, does not exclude human freedom by maintaining an uncompromising determinism. It is only when man chooses evil rather than good that these particular moral laws become operative. Olbos, it would appear, is not in itself good or bad: it merely provides a stricter test for the moral and intellectual discipline of the person concerned. And while olbos thus constitutes a fertile breeding ground for keros and hybris, it does not mean that human responsibility is ruled out.

Furthermore, the congenital curse does not operate in any capricious way. At the outset some avoidable error initiates the process. Where a certain moral law indicates that the curse will

fall upon innocent children it does appear that freedom is seriously called into question. But even here it is by no means clear that human responsibility has no place. It must be admitted that all freedom is limited by time and circumstance, but moralists subsequent to Solon were never prepared to believe that visitation of the ancestral curse absolved the victim of all responsibility.

Thus a view of life which left men helpless before the jealousy of the gods cannot be deduced from the fragments, and would moreover be quite contrary to the spirit of the work, which appears to have been based entirely upon humanistic principles. After an objective

scrutiny of social life in Athens, he diagnoses the trouble and proceeds to effect the cure in a scientific way, by compromise and reconciliation of interests - "according to that blend of force and justice that is law" (Fr. 30, 31). Again, the principle behind "nothing in excess" also implies "nothing too little"¹. If the rights of all were to be safeguarded by law, the responsibilities of all were similarly emphasized. Fathers were compelled to care for the professional training of their sons, and the Areopagus to penalize laziness². Citizens were also prohibited under forfeit of citizenship from remaining neutral in internal dissensions³. There is no "taboo" upon any form of activity, nor does "sacredness" ensure the inviolability of any institution. Practical considerations alone count.

With Solon *μηδὲν ἄγαν* means the bringing of reason to bear upon instinct or passion. "The people best follow its leaders if it be neither given undue liberty nor unduly oppressed; for excess bears arrogance, whenever great prosperity attends on men whose minds are not well balanced" (Frs. 4 and 5). The result of selfish excess is not so much that it involves divine displeasure, as that society cannot continue to function

¹ In Fr. 27 we find a most picturesque illustration of the mean as developed more than two centuries later by Aristotle. Solon takes the span of human life and divides it into "hebdomads". The first six "hebdomads" are defective for various reasons such as physical imperfection or wild behaviour. In the seventh and eighth hebdomads man is in his prime (*ἑπτὰ δὲ νοῦν καὶ γλῶσσαν ἐν ἐβδόμῳ καὶ ἑβδόμῳ*). They constitute the mean - not too little and not too much. After fifty years of age a man sinks naturally down towards death.

² Plut. Solon 22.

³ Plut. Solon 20: Ath. Pol. VIII, 5.

(Frs. 2, 31), and man would seem to be dependent upon society for his well-being. Freedom is completely dependent upon the acceptance of a public discipline (Fr. 2), that is, upon the rational ordering of human inclination in the light of social demands; and *μὴδὲν ἀγῶν* comes to express the fundamental law of life, not imposed by an autocratic deity, but evolved by rational men in the light of human experience.

Now such a statement concerning human psychology must upon reflection appeal to what is reasonable in man. It rings true in that it is borne out by human experience. But the mere statement of such a general principle is not enough: its implications must be clearly elaborated and its application to the demands of public life fully ascertained. Liberty is dependent for its existence upon the acceptance of law, and law to be of specific value must find expression in a corpus of laws, rules or regulations. These must enjoy an existence of their own, independent of the caprices and passions of particular groups or individuals if they are to secure the welfare of the whole and function as the ultimate guides and correctives in society.

Thus Solon states his general conviction: "These are the lessons which my heart bids me teach the Athenians, how that lawlessness (*δυσνομία*) brings innumerable ills to the State, but good legislation (*εὐνομία*) shows forth all things in order (*εὐκόσμος*) and harmony (*ἀρετή*), and at the same time sets shackles upon the unjust" (Fr. 2). This idea inspires all his legislation. Law is supported and enforced by the general will, and citizenship, among other things, represents a tacit undertaking to support the constitution by all the power at one's command.

Since our object is to discover the development of ideas of freedom in Greek thought, this is hardly the place for a detailed analysis of Solon's actual legislation. Suffice it to show how the thought of Solon which we have endeavoured to elicit from his recorded statements is plainly reflected in the work that he did. ^{the} Seisachtheia was a surgical operation of the most drastic kind. Old sanctities were disregarded, and Solon plunged into the task of alleviating distress due to debt. No question of property rights was considered: the welfare of the people concerned took precedence over former laws and customs. We have his word that the infamous boundary stones were forthwith plucked from out the bosom of Mother Earth, and the land, formerly enslaved, now set free (Frs. 50, 51). Those unfortunates who had been sold abroad for debt, as well as those enslaved at home, were liberated. Thus at one stroke the whole complexion of social life was changed, and legislation subsequently passed forbidding debts made upon security of the person. Analogous to this was the amnesty enabling all exiles, except homicides and supporters of tyranny, to return home.

~~If these preliminary measures enacted by Solon struck an effective blow at aristocratic control, his subsequent legislation concerning property was no less important in the same connection. Before his time, we are informed¹, no will could be made, but the entire estate of the deceased had to remain in his family. But by the new laws, under certain conditions, the head of the family was allowed to dispense the property~~

¹ Plat. Solon 21.

In this same connection should be noted Solon's legis-¹lation concerning property. Before his time, we are informed, no will could be made, but the entire estate of the deceased had to remain in his family. But by the new laws, under certain conditions, the head of the family was permitted to nominate² an heir outside the family if he so desired.

¹ Plut. Solon 21.

² One authority has taken exception to the common view that this law constituted a striking concession to the right of the individual (X. Freeman. "Work and Life of Solon", p. 115 ff.). We are reminded that the purpose of this regulation regarding bequests becomes clear only when it is considered in connection with the laws regarding adoption.

But even though the heir, by adoption into the family, may be looked upon as continuing the line of the testator, and as holding the property in trust for that line, yet he and his heirs become the permanent holders of that property, and the measure does actually give the individual a freedom which he did not possess before.

~~outside the family if he so desired.~~ Not only were social injustices removed, however, but by means of economic and political reforms, Solon put it in the power of all to safeguard their interests for the future.

Much of the poverty and oppression in Attica had formerly been due to her agricultural economy. While Solon improved the situation by measures relative to water-supply, protection of live-stock, protection of adjacent properties, and, above all, by the prohibition of the export of all natural products except olive oil¹, his master stroke consisted in definitely turning the attention from agriculture to commerce and industry. Crafts were encouraged, fathers being legally bound to apprentice their sons to some trade. Foreigners were invited to settle and practise their craft, and the new regulation of coinage and measures² gave great impetus to production and distribution.

The Athenians, however, were not allowed to content themselves with these new opportunities offered for improving their physical condition. Solon saw that the point on which all his reforms turned for their efficacy was political education, and it was his constitutional reforms which did more than anything else to break up the old inertia and inaugurate the process of social and political development culminating in Periclean democracy. Here his principle of compromise is much in evidence. A new sense of responsibility is also emphasized in the encouragement of active political interest; and the reforms were carried out in such a spirit of moderation that tyranny in Athens had difficulty in holding out for a generation against the desire for constitutional government.

¹Plut. Solon 23

²Ath. Pol. X

Solon's enlightened liberalism is manifest. No effort is here made to represent him as a modern intellectual agnostic. In his references to the religion of his day he invariably appears amiably orthodox: but the vital point remains that in his work old religious sanctions are ignored and city life organized on a strictly humanistic basis. His technique speaks for itself. Plutarch would like to make him hallow the ties of kindred and sanctify the bonds of affection between friends¹ but in reality he merely sought to regularize both on the basis of mutual interest. He lived before his time, as the reaction which followed indicates. But under tyranny the seeds which he had sown had full opportunity to germinate, and while Solon was the author of all that was best in Athenian polity, the oligarchs referred to by Aristotle were prompted by a sure instinct when they pointed to him as the author of their political woes.² For Solon, in launching the idea of human responsibility, of men's right and duty to order their own destinies, in repudiating ideas of privilege and political obscurantism, did indeed light a candle in Athens that could not be put out.

It seems right at this stage to consider the work of Theognis, since there is thought to be considerable confusion in ancient sources between his writings and those of Solon.³ From

¹ Plut. Solon, 21.

² Politics, 1274, A, 3.

³Vid. Croiset. History of Gr. Literature, Abr. Ed., p. 125.
 "Theognis is often an original and daring thinker. Intelligent and passionate, discontented and argumentative, he invests his reflections on traditional ideas with a bitter, tragic note, and also with a dialectical, critical turn which by its bold, urgent vigour anticipates Xenophanes."

the standpoint of style it would appear impossible to pronounce any final judgment, but on the basis of general content there can hardly be any argument. It is true that at first sight Theognis is startling; so much so that he draws from no less an authority than M. Robin¹ a remarkable tribute; but a close examination of his thought reveals the fact that he and Solon were poles apart in their point of view. If, as suggested above², Solon followed closely the dictates of reason and kept passion in abeyance, it would seem that Theognis very successfully reversed the order. The poisoned darts of his invective fly helter-skelter in the political world of his day. His violent and scurrilous criticisms, comparable in vigour to the gibes of his contemporary Xenophanes, arise from deep-rooted prejudices which find eloquent expression through a keen perception and vivid imagination.

He sees the changes imminent in social and political relationships, but fails to understand them. The common people no longer know their place; they ape their betters, and by sheer weight of numbers relegate the "noble men" (*οἱ ἀγαθοὶ*) to a position of obscurity. It is intolerable to hear of *ειδωτὸν* serfs insisting on their rights. The times are out of joint (*ἴσ' ἔχει τὰ ὕψ' ἀρέχουσ' ἄσπετον*) (Lines 55-60)³. The serious social unrest must eventually produce a tyrant (39-40):

¹ Greek Thought. Book I, Ch. 1.

² Page

³ Text used is that adopted by E. Harrison. Studies in Theognis, Camb. 1902.

meanwhile the "good men" have sunk into apathy. Private gain and desire for power have blinded the eyes of all alike (16).

How does Theognis respond to this general condition? Solon had accepted the phenomenon of change and had striven to meet the new demands and adjust institutions to fit changing needs. Theognis rests on his oars, beguiled by the wish that is father to the thought. We are as we are made, he says (437-8), and human art has no part to play in moulding human nature. Virtue is innate, and "the good" have a prescriptive right over this commodity. The "nouveaux riches" by marrying into a class above their own station corrupt the purer strain (183-92).

Nothing could be more reactionary than this. Although living fifty to a hundred years after Solon's day Theognis was rooted in the dark ages of Greek history. He perceived the threat of tyranny in Megara (541, 2) (1099, 1100), but failed to see the proper method of countering the danger. Tyranny must be met with its own weapons. Constitutional rulers, if they are to continue in authority, must appreciate the new factors which have come into the life of Sixth Century Greece; they must shed their effete aristocratic prepossessions, and come to suitable terms with the people. This condition had been thoroughly understood by Solon nearly a century before, but with Theognis it was different; an extensive "blind spot" marred his vision, and he failed utterly to understand the meaning of the popular clamour. He was, moreover, on his own admission (419, 420) not a practical man, and his diatribe was perhaps seasoned with the additional venom which proceeds from a consciousness of impotence or inferiority.

There appears complete confusion in his mind, on the question of human responsibility. We might be tempted to think that his eloquent complaint to Zeus (373-396) means that, in his view, religion had failed to keep pace with morality. But Theognis appears not to regard the problem in this light. His querulous expostulation has, in view of his imperfect apprehension of the problem, a marked pathos. He sees "the ungodly in high places, and flourishing like a green bay tree". His view of justice demands that time should rectify this error. He wishes to continue with the psalmist: "I passed by and lo, he was gone; I sought him and his place could nowhere be found", but life was not like that. His entire attitude suggests a harking back to the good old days, peevish dissatisfaction with things as they are, and a fundamental disinclination or inability to understand current trends.

He states that the gods dispense evil and good as they will (133-42). He would like to shift responsibility from human shoulders, although in 831-36 he absolves the gods of blame and attributes his misfortunes to the violence, rapine and stealth of his fellow men. It is noticeable that he still assumes no share of responsibility for himself.

~~The problem of the congenital curse appears in lines 721-56, again in 127-210, and is evidently becoming more acute by the end of the sixth century. The principle is accepted by Theognis and he thus illustrates once more how wide a gulf exists between his thought and Solon's. With this idea of divine punishment for sin waiting to strike hapless individuals, whose only offence was that they had been born into certain ill-starred families, there could co-exist no self-~~

The problem of the congenital curse appears in lines 731-86, again in 197-210, and is evidently becoming more acute by the end of the sixth century. And although, as suggested above (p. 72), this doctrine by no means eliminates the factor of human responsibility, yet it is evident that a clarification of the problem is required before men may claim a proper measure of self-assurance and initiative. While statesmen had already virtually rejected the principle, it remained for theologians of the next century to deal explicitly with it, and to attempt to reconcile freedom and necessity in this connection.

In another place (94E-48) Theognis advocates the middle course in lines that echo Solon. Solon's doctrine of the mean, however, had been an expression of faith in the idea of compromise, essentially positive and constructive, but for Theognis, it means little more than "sitting on the fence" for reasons of personal expediency.

Thus we are forced to the view that Theognis represents a reversion to pre-Solonian thought. In our quest for signs of development in ideas of freedom he helps us not at all. But before conflict with Persia gave such impetus to the development of thought in Greece proper, there were already individuals and schools elsewhere on the fringes of the Greek world pondering problems which their keen wits and the exigencies of their condition formulated for them, and these problems may be shown to be not entirely irrelevant to our theme.

CHAPTER IVLIBERTY AND LICENSE: THE CONFLICTBETWEEN DISCIPLINE AND DISORDER IN ASIA MINOR

If we would discover those forms in which the problem of freedom appeared in the history of Greek thought, examining the obstacles to the free expression of human impulse and the means devised to circumvent them, it is evident that we cannot limit ourselves to the study of any particular school or group. Poets, statesmen, moralists, physicists, in their writings or recorded sayings, all indicate the problem in some measure even though they do not explicitly formulate it.

In the sixth century B.C. the thought of Greece becomes much more complex. Specialization is already taking place, and for purposes of convenience it is customary to study the history of the period in more or less clearly defined categories. But specialized study undoubtedly has serious disadvantages, chief among which is the difficulty in maintaining proper perspective and viewing the movement under examination in proper relation to other contemporary activity. Consequently, for our purpose it would seem best to modify this method somewhat by imposing limits of time rather than of province. And since the second decade of the fifth century marks a critical juncture in the general development of Greece, it is not unreasonable to take our stand at that point and examine the gains made up to date.

We have already in Chapter I considered the heroic poetry of Ionia, along with the far-reaching changes taking place in

the organization of Homeric society. Subsequent efforts such as those of the Cyclic poets were manifestly inferior, and have no bearing upon our subject. They perpetuate the outward form of the epic, but could not sustain its genius and vitality once the peculiar environmental conditions amidst which the poetry of Homer came to birth had passed away. Indeed even in the *Odyssey*, as already noted, there seems a distinct falling away from heroic standards. As has been remarked¹, while the *Odyssey* "resembles the *Iliad* in many respects", yet "its tone and spirit are those of an age which has suffered some humiliation". Changing/social conditions in the Greek world, particularly in Ionia, necessitated a change from the heroic viewpoint. The privileged aristocracies were passing away, and much more consideration had to be accorded the new bourgeoisie, as well as the mass of common folk of whom so little was heard in the *Iliad*. In the *Iliad*, compromise with the gods or with Fate had been a comparatively simple matter, but a settled life on the coast of Asia Minor, with the new experience gained from travel and association with other peoples, was working changes that could not immediately be comprehended. In the *Odyssey*, in consequence, the naive and exuberant self-confidence of the *Iliad* is missing: the freedom of the individual had been further checked by certain forces at work in the social organism.

This change in social conditions, as we have seen, which tended to introduce another motif into the *Odyssey*, is very much accentuated when we turn to the poetry of Hesiod. In Hesiod's Boeotia man had his back to the wall, oppressed not only by the designs of his fellows, but also by the implacable hostility of

¹ Cf. H. V. Rieu. *God, Man, and Epic Poetry*. Vol. II p. 30: 99

nature; and poetry became essentially utilitarian and didactic. But as a result of this laborious struggle for existence Greece proper may be seen ironically enough, to have avoided the pitfall which Ionia was doomed sooner or later to encounter; for it seems certain that the very poverty and hostility with which man was faced in nature prompted him to formulate a discipline of life which the easier mode of existence in Asiatic Greece rendered less obvious and urgent.

The longer Epic poetry occupied chief place in the aesthetic consciousness of Greece, the less able it became to express human sentiments and ideals. With City organization supplanting the old patriarchal kingdom, and a commercial aristocracy replacing the former feudal society, there developed a new spirit which called for a new mode of literary expression. The moral problems of Achilles were out of date, and there arose the need to treat imaginatively those factors in contemporary life which caused man fear, worry and delight. It became necessary to devise new forms through which to express these new ideas, and it was in the Seventh Century that this movement saw the light. It was natural that such a movement should first manifest itself among the Eastern Greeks. There, in Asia Minor, after the Dorian migrations, the artistic tradition survived more strongly, and the easier acquisition of wealth accounted for a more advanced civilization than was to be found in continental Greece.

Most of the lyric poetry of Ionia has perished, and it may be objected that the residual fragments can yield no proper conception of its original content. Furthermore it may be claimed that the lyricists, as poets, can hardly be looked

to for views on political freedom, with which their poetry is not primarily concerned. But it is also true that from the mutilated remains of their work, as M. Croiset says ¹, we may see that most of them have an original character, "in which the impress of their race and time is combined in a most interesting way with traits peculiar to them alone". It is possible to gather some idea of their race and time from other sources, notably Herodotus, and as we shall observe, their poetry does to some extent reflect the turmoil of political thought in Ionia for a century and more prior to the Persian invasion.

At first sight the work of the Ionian lyricists seem to indicate a liberation and efflorescence of the human spirit. Owing perhaps in part to the material wealth and the opportunities for intercourse with other peoples which commerce and industry offered, the Greeks of Asia Minor were able to rid themselves of traditional restrictions at an earlier age than their neighbours in Greece proper. Novelty of theme and treatment is apparent in the poetry of Mimnermus of Colophon (c. 630 B.C.) as he sings of youth and love. Paying homage to divine Aphrodite, he deplures the ravages made by time upon human beauty ². His fierce ³ serious joy in youth has its counterpart in a loathing of old age, and the precariousness of the present merely gives it a more irresistible attraction. But the scepticism and melancholy of his point of view ³ points to fatalism rather than to freedom. He seems to despair of

¹ History of Greek Literature. Abr. Ch. VII, p. 93.

² Theodor Bergk. Greek Lyric Poets, Fr. 1.

³ Ibid. Frs. 3, 5, 5.

arresting the fugitive joys of life: he can only hope for a temporary quickening of the pulse as they hurry by.

Archilochus of Paros (c. 670 B.C.) suffered much buffeting from the winds of fortune, and became bitter in consequence. Rebell¹ing against misfortune and the intractability of his fellow-men, he sought independence by enlisting as a mercenary soldier. But it was in verse that he found the best vehicle for self-expression, and in this we again witness an intense delight in the things of sense - in military exploits and the drinking of wine² - against a gloomy background of fatalistic resignation.

Simonides of Amorgos, possibly a contemporary of Archilochus, depicts man as but a plaything of the gods³. But he responds to such a condition in a new way. Such impotence on the part of man may be mildly amusing to a detached observer; and the satirist appears even more plainly in his fanciful speculation as to the possible origin of certain feminine types⁴.

But in none of the lyrists is there such glorification of individual passion as in Alcaeus and Sappho. Here we encounter a picturesque portrayal of intense and variegated feeling. Alcaeus pays constant tribute to the drinking bowl: wine helps⁵ to dispel the discomforts of winter weather; deep draughts of wine are the proper medicine for misfortune⁶: it bids care begone; and provides an infallible remedy for all kinds of physical disorder⁷. The language employed is full of picturesque

¹ Ibid. Frs. 27, 66.

² Ibid. Frs. 4, 6, 15, 16.

³ Ibid. Fr. 1

⁴ Ibid. Fr. 1

⁵ Ibid. Fr. 37.

⁶ Ibid. Fr. 35

⁷ Ibid. Fr. 41.

metaphor, and the thought charged with an extraordinarily imaginative quality. The poet's naive delight in human beauty recognizes no restraint except that of a refined taste, and his verse plainly indicates how far he had found freedom by way of the imagination. So in the case of Sappho. The brilliant imaginative quality of her insight is at once apparent. The prevailing themes of beauty and love are presented in a variety of forms, according to the poet's mood. Under her guidance the senses are abnormally stimulated by a brilliant use of hyperbole and simile. When listening to the sweet accents and winning laughter of her lover she 'feels a god; the heart in her breast beats fast and high; speech fails, and a delicate fire overruns her flesh; her eyes grow dim, and her ears ring, until she is as green and pale as the grass, and death itself seems not very far away'. Love shakes her heart as a down-rushing whirlwind that falls upon the oaks¹. But the poet's taste never descends to vulgarity, although, in company with the "sweet lads, colour, tune, and rhyme", she enjoys the freedom of the Maenad on the mountain slopes.

Thus it may be seen that the lyricists achieved a remarkable degree of freedom in the realm of the emotions. But how secure was such freedom? What was the social and political basis on which it rested? We find that their poetry reflects to some extent the practical problems with which the Greeks of Asia Minor were faced. In it we constantly encounter protest against existing conditions. The poets offer praise and blame; they advocate certain lines of conduct; they moralize; and hence the term

1

Ibid. Fr. 2.

2

Fr. 58, *Lyra Graeca* (Loeb Series).

"gnomic" which is applied to them. And it is in this phase of their activity that the great weakness of Ionian thought appears. Callinus of Ephesus (c. 700 B.C.) gives evidence of strong political feeling when attacking the lethargy of his countrymen. The Cimmerians were threatening life and liberty, but the young men of Ephesus were shameless in their pursuit of pleasure and ease. 'They considered themselves at peace although war covered the land'¹. They should cultivate the martial virtues of courage, discipline, and endurance, if they would escape the infamy that attaches to a coward's death. Phocylides of Miletus, a contemporary of Theognis, knows how necessary is a well-organized public life - "better a small city perched upon a rock² than all the dizzy splendour of Nineveh"³.

The political songs of Alcaeus are especially instructive. His Lesbian ardor urges him on, and tears of sorrow or of joy frequently blind his eyes. His vision is always restricted to the condition of local affairs in his own city. He likens the disturbances caused by the tyrants to stormy weather at sea⁴. He would rather die than see Myrsilus or Pittacus in power. "Tis time for wine and time for women now that Myrsilus is dead"⁴ indicates the extent to which Alcaeus was governed by passion. His opposition to Pittacus expressed itself in the most violent abuse⁵, and he was content to suffer exile rather

¹ Bergk, Fr. 1.

⁴ Ibid. Fr. 20.

² Ibid. Fr. 5.

⁵ Frs. 374, 28: 102, 51 (Iyra Graeca)

³ Ibid. Frs. 10, 19.

than submit to the reasonable regimentation which Iktinos as a desynete enforced.

Thus we may gather some idea of the manner in which political problems were viewed. There is frequent protest against political apathy in terms which point to a widespread condition, but there is little indication that such protest involved any positive scheme for betterment, or that it met with any real success. It would appear that the lyric poets were mainly concerned with securing perfect freedom in thought and conduct for themselves. They protest violently against any curtailment of that freedom, but they are interested in political organization for the most part only in so far as it affects their own freedom of action. They constitute, as it were, an unofficial Opposition: they have nothing positive and constructive to offer; and certainly there is no indication that they considered the 'good life' dependent upon the organization of the state. There is something suggestive in the fact that Archilochus, Alcaeus, and Anacreon could all laugh of the way in which they throw away their shields. Any form of regimentation would be anathema to them: they merely wanted no interference.

It may be thought that such a point of view is natural to art, and that it is unfair to assume it to be typical of Ionian life in general. But in order that we may not seem to base our conclusions as to the characteristic attitude of Ionians upon scattered poetical fragments, we shall try to show how the history of the period gleaned from other sources bears out the necessarily thin testimony of the lyricists.

It can be shown from Herodotus that the Greeks of Asia Minor were politically impotent, and for all their intellectual superiority proved consistently unable to secure their material welfare. Their industry and commerce brought within reach the prerequisites of the "good life", but, unable to organize public life, both within the city and among the separate states, on sound constitutional lines, they fell a constant prey to internal strife as well as to external aggression. Originally all the Greeks of Asia Minor were free, and Croesus was the first of all the barbarians known to us to subdue the Ionians, Aeolians, and Dorians settled in Asia¹. They submitted to this subjugation one by one². Local quarrels resulted in weakness against a common enemy, as when Miletus found herself isolated in her war with Alyattes, and none of the Ionians, with the exception of the Chians, came to her assistance³. The Ionians and Aeolians, unwilling to risk any opposition to Cyrus, sent ambassadors, wishing to become subject to him on the same terms as they had been to Croesus. Their request was refused. A meeting was held at the Panionium, the sole result of which being that walls were built round the several cities and assistance asked of Sparta⁴. We are told that, weak as the Grecian race then was, the Ionian element was weakest of all and of least account. That is why the twelve cities had deemed it necessary to separate from the rest. These twelve cities gloried in the name

¹ Herod. I, 6.

² Ibid. I, 26: 28.

³ Ibid. I, 16.

⁴ Ibid. I, 141: 143.

Ionian, and built the temple Panionium to symbolize their unity, an unfortunate choice of name when we consider that it was closed to all other Ionians and Asiatic Greeks except the Smyrnaeans¹. The same sectionalism was operative among the Dorian cities to the south, with their "Pentapolis"². Moreover, at this critical juncture, when the cities of the coast were no longer sheltered from the power of Persia by Lydia, the Lesbians and Tenedians, as well as the Ionians of the Islands, abstained from action in the belief that their insularity rendered intervention unnecessary³. The Phocaeans, unable by themselves to resist Harpagus, were forced to migrate to Corsica⁴. These were the only Ionians who abandoned their country rather than submit to servitude: the rest, with the exception of Miletus, made their submission to Cyrus⁵. The Carians also, and all the Greeks that inhabited adjacent parts, showed no courage before submitting⁶. Regular tribute was subsequently imposed upon the Ionians and Aeolians by Darius in accordance with his new organization of the empire⁷. The account of Histiaeus and Miltiades debating Greek policy at the mouth of the Ister is full of difficulty, but it serves to illustrate the conflict of ideas among the separate city-states. Histiaeus sought to justify his support of Darius on the ground that every one reigned over his own city by the

¹ Ibid. I, 143.

⁵ Ibid. I, 169.

² Ibid. I, 144.

⁶ Ibid. I, 174.

³ Ibid. I, 143: 141.

⁷ Ibid. III, 90.

⁴ Ibid. I, 165.

consent of the king. If the power of Darius should be destroyed, Histiaeus would lose control of Miletus, and the other tyrants would be forced to relinquish their cities, since every state would choose to be governed rather by a democracy than a tyranny¹. On the whole, there would appear very good reason for the alleged judgment of the Scythians, that "the Ionians, when free, were the most cowardly of men, and when slaves the most attached to their masters and least inclined to run away"². And it is most significant that they were at last compelled by their Persian masters to accept a unity which they had refused to impose upon themselves at the suggestion³ of Thales. They were over-ready to accept the kindly offices of tyrants, but when tyranny proved too oppressive they

¹ Ibid. IV, 137.

² Ibid. IV, 142

³ Ibid. VI, 42: I, 170.

rebelled, only to reveal themselves subsequently bankrupt of constructive political ideas¹. During the seventh and sixth centuries there was ample evidence of the danger that threatened from the east. The Cimmerian invasion, the policy of the Lydian kings, and, finally, the irresistible energy of Persia, could portend but one fate unless Ionia applied herself seriously to the task of securing her position. Thrasybulus exercised tyrannical power at the close of the seventh century and did much to improve the condition of Miletus, strongly resisting any encroachment on the part of Lydia, and establishing strategic centres of trade on the Black Sea. Polycrates of Samos gave promise of stout resistance to Persia once the Lydian kingdom had disintegrated. He went so far as to establish control over "many of the islands and many cities on the continent"², but the political apathy of his contemporaries was such as to paralyse force as well as persuasion. Thales might advocate a defensive confederacy against Cyrus³; or Bias of Priene a large-scale migration to Sardinia⁴, but such recommendations fell upon deaf ears. The Panionium appears to have been for the most part a social institution⁵, and although the Ionian deputies there in 494 B.C. decided upon a concerted naval effort at Iade⁶, only the picturesque figure of Dionysius the Phocæan emerged from the subsequent fiasco with unsullied reputation.

Callinus, Mimnermus, Phocylides, and Alcaeus evinced considerable political feeling upon occasion, but there is no

¹ Cf. Alcaeus against Myrsilus.

⁴ Ibid. I, 170.

² Herod. III, 39.

⁵ Herod. I, 143.

³ Ibid. I, 170.

evidence in the literary work of the poets, or in the practical efforts of politicians, that either had any proper appreciation of the issues at stake or of the means to be adopted in order to ensure their own survival. Continental Greece, as early as Hesiod, had formulated a bona fide way of life, marked by high seriousness, intellectual honesty, and consistency of purpose. The Delphic Apollo ever enjoined the constant checking of impulse by reason (*ὑπὸν λόγον*), and the maintenance of order and discipline both in the individual and in the community. But Ionia neglected this fundamental feature of Greek life. License masqueraded as freedom and rugged individualism as liberty. For literary minds the function of discipline and law was limited to the structure of those poetical measures through which was expressed a tumultuous riot of feeling. The artistic achievement of Ionia was, so to speak, a premature bloom enjoying a tentative and precarious life upon a stock of social structure fundamentally weak and ill-formed. Literature damned the society that gave it birth by celebrating artistically a melancholy world-weariness or an exorcising delight in the things of sense. The profound pessimism which everywhere clogged the channels of creative achievement expressed itself formally in the idea of divine power (distinct from the Olympian gods) as a foil to human impotence. ~~And while it is misleading to think that any formulated doctrine of the "jealous god", or of~~¹
~~vibes, keros, hybris and ate appeared before the Fifth Century,~~

¹ ~~J. Burnet in his *Greek Philosophy: Thales to Plato*, is guilty of an anachronism at this point. There is no evidence of such a systematized doctrine in Greek literature prior to the fifth century.~~

~~its roots are undoubtedly there, and Herodotus is substantially right in thrusting this systematization back into a world in which, strictly speaking, it would have been unrecognizable~~¹
 There were no religious standards of conduct. It was customary for poetry to pay constant lip-service to the old gods², but their only title to human interest lay in their anthropomorphic nature reflecting the passions of men. In such a polytheism each divinity stressed some particular human characteristic, hence it was possible for the individual to maintain equipoise only by careful discrimination and eclecticism. It was so much easier to regard the gods as providing adequate religious sanction for one's own particular weakness.

We should, however, be wrong in assuming that this attitude of mind was universal in the Greek world at the time. In Sparta as early as the seventh century Tyrtaeus was using the conventional literary forms to a very different purpose. His elegies, comprising the *Eunomia* and the *Exhortations*, so far from being mere entertainment, were definitely directed toward cultivating a new morality and public spirit. Factional individualism was attacked and those virtues extolled that made for order and stability. It seems that the very poverty of Greece proper did indeed act as a brake upon license, enabling her to consolidate her intellectual gains slowly but surely³. We have already shown how at the close of the seventh century Solon still further strains the framework of elegiac and iambic poetry. The grace of Ionic

¹ Herod. VII, 101-104.

² Vid. Hymns to the gods - Alcaeus, Callinus, Sappho, Anacreon.

³ Cf. Herod. VII, 102.

verse is by no means absent, while the simple directness of Tyrtaeus in dealing with patent difficulties is with Solon developed into an intelligent and intellectual approach to the diversified problems of a more advanced society. Even in Theognis, whose bankruptcy of constructive ideas has been noted, there is discernible a marked aversion to the creeping paralysis of Ionian thought. His violent protests at least demand that literature come to terms with life. In Simonides and Pindar we reach the stage where the choral lyric was perfected. Like the Aristotelian tragedy it found its proper form and then stopped. But Pindar requires special treatment, and since he brings us into the fifth century it is necessary first to retrace our steps.

Enough has perhaps been said to show that the people of Ionia had become victims of a tradition. As their literature shews, they were anxious to develop a culture from their affluence, but, in contrast with their Western neighbours, they over-stressed the appreciative side and paid too little attention to the organization and development of the material structure. The trouble was that life was in the main too easy for them, and it is probable that Herodotus in contrasting inordinate license with the freedom to be found within the fabric of law ¹ was reflecting a condition of life that existed in Greece itself, independent of the Oriental view. At the close of the sixth century B.C. Ionia and Continental Greece found themselves at the parting of the ways. Lydia, which had constituted a buffer state between the East and West for so

¹ Herod. VII, 102-104.

long, had already been swallowed up by Persia under the energetic Cyrus, and Nemesis was about to overtake Ionian lethargy. Whether or not Greece was to have her early promise cut short depended not upon the rather spectacular achievement of Ionia, but upon the homelier and more solid gains of Greece proper. However, before the Greek spirit finally triumphed and gave such an amazing impetus to general development, there remain further movements in the sixth century world which call for examination.

In condemning the spirit which by its political obscurantism during the seventh and sixth centuries bade fair to extinguish the light that had been kindled in Ionia, certain reservations must be made. The Milesians, who had held their own so admirably under the guidance of Thasybulus in the early stages of the sixth century¹, subsequently fell upon misfortune for half a century² before regaining composure. But from the first they would appear to have taken a very practical view of the forces that threatened their position. It was evident that the excessive love of local independence³ rendered impracticable any form of federal organization, in spite of such efforts as that of Thales of Miletus on its behalf. While the other cities, however, remained for the most part oblivious to the danger that mocked their freedom, the Milesians struck out boldly on an independent course to consolidate their gains and safeguard their interests.

¹ Ibid. I, 20-22.

² Ibid. V, 28.

³ Cf. p. 89 ff.

Their special merit was not that they pursued an independent course - that was rendered inevitable by the perversity of their neighbours - but that they understood the situation in which they were placed, and saw that if they were to preserve the conditions of freedom, they must pay heed to the political factors involved. Peace was made with Alyattes of Lydia and political independence preserved; and Croesus in his imperialistic programme was willing to respect this arrangement of his predecessor. Upon the break-up of the Lydian Empire in 546 B.C. the Milesians were wise enough to continue their conciliatory policy¹ and were successful in coming to terms with Cyrus. It was not until

¹ Ibid. I, 141.

the end of the sixth century that Miletus threw away the advantages she had enjoyed for so long in submitting to the irresponsible leadership of Aristagoras. Never had Miletus stood so well in the eyes of Persia as when Histiaeus performed such a signal service to Darius at the mouth of the Danube. This solid gain was completely lost by the ambitious opportunism of Histiaeus, followed by the crass stupidity of his son-in-law Aristagoras. The calm arguments of Hecataeus were of no avail¹, and the city was destroyed in 494 B.C.

From the foregoing it may be seen that Miletus differed widely from the rest of Ionia in point of stamina and fortitude. She was consistently alive to the real dangers of her position, and by coming to terms with those dangers was enabled throughout the sixth century to make her way into a position of supremacy in the Greek world. Just prior to the revolt of Aristagoras Miletus "had attained the summit of her prosperity and was accounted the glory of Ionia"². As a very ancient Cretan colony she had a share in the oldest Hellenic civilization, and as an intermediary between Lydia and the Western World she had been brought into contact with the Babylonian and Egyptian civilizations. Her active interest ranged from Naucratis on the south to the Black Sea on the north. Thus the magnificent rôle played by Miletus, in contrast with the improvident hedonism of Ionia in general, ensured in her a degree of material prosperity and a universality of outlook which could hardly fail eventually to find expression in an

¹ Herod. V, 36.

² Ibid. V, 28.

outcrop of intellectual vigour; and it was in this setting that the Milesian School of Philosophy came to birth.

Before noting the precise form in which this intellectual vigour finally expressed itself, however, it is instructive to recall the manner in which Thales reacted to the practical problems which threatened Greek life in Asia Minor. Tradition has it that he and Solon actually met in Miletus¹. However that may be, it remains true that they had much in common. It would appear that experience in the larger world had emancipated them from the obscurantist influences of city-state life. Both probably appreciated the stifling effect of common religious beliefs upon human enterprise, and were wise enough in their work virtually to ignore those considerations without inflaming popular prejudice by acrid criticism. Like Plato's ideal educators², they endeavoured to lead their fellow-men insensibly from error to truth. They both at the outset displayed a vital interest in practical affairs. Solon limited himself to the study of human relationships within the polis, for which Plutarch, from great spiritual altitude, offers benevolent apology³. But such apology would seem quite gratuitous. The Athenian statesman succeeded to some extent in stabilizing society and regularizing human freedom in the city.

¹ Plutarch. Solon, VI.

² Plato. Rep. 401 D.

³ Plutarch. Solon, III. "In philosophy, as most of the wise men at that time, Solon chiefly esteemed the political part of morals: in physics he was very plain and antiquated." "Thales alone had raised philosophy above mere practice into speculation."

By indicating the general lines along which development should take place, he was laying a sure foundation for the magnificent achievement of the fifth century. And we are forced to admit that even the work of the Milesian School would probably have been smothered at birth had the discipline and solidarity of Greece proper, in particular of Athens, not withstood the shock of Oriental invasion. Thales, also, was anxious to secure stability in public life. Aware of the danger that threatened Greek life from the East, he tried to break down the petty spirit of independence which separated the Ionian communities. He could see that the insistent and jealous guarding of local or individual interests, already referred to, threatened disaster for all concerned; hence he tried to unite the Ionian cities in a defensive confederacy against the Persians, with headquarters at Teos¹. He also gave active support to Croesus in his strategy against Cyrus². But Thales was not as successful as Solon in this matter of organizing public life. It would seem, as we have already tried to shew, that he had very different material to deal with. The stubborn resistance encountered compelled him, as it compelled certain other enlightened Ionians³, to relinquish the task of attempting to organize politically a politically unorganizable people.

But Thales' main work lay in his study of nature; and although his work and the work of his successors Anaximander and Anaximenes has no direct bearing upon the subject of our study,

¹ Herod. I, 170.

² Ibid. I, 75.

³ Vid. .p

the new method of investigation which he inaugurated was nevertheless destined, when further developed in the next century, to revolutionize all thought, including the specific subject of human freedom. In the meantime we may draw attention to the implications of his method. Traditional processes and categories were discarded, and the human intellect burst into vigorous activity. Man set out to conquer the universe by way of the intellect, and those popular beliefs and superstitions which had restricted human freedom for so long received a setback from which they never again properly recovered. There came into operation the scientific method of probing and proving, of analysis and integration. Such a method speaks for itself: it presupposes man's perfect freedom to understand his Universe; it sets in motion a process which by the force of its own logic puts an end to those irrational factors which impede human development, and at the same time begins to erect a fabric of law and order within which perfect freedom can alone be secured.

Thus the beginnings of philosophy in Asia Minor, while not dealing specifically with the problem of freedom as presented in this study, are nevertheless of the greatest importance from our point of view, in that they involve a pronounced departure from previous methods, and will eventually demand a special treatment of the problem in the light of the new knowledge accumulated.

CHAPTER VTHE CRISIS OF HELLENISM:THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM AS EXEMPLIFIED IN PINDAR

The conflict with Persia in the early fifth century represents a critical juncture in the history of Greece. As a result of the impact the Greeks were suddenly ushered into a new world, and many of the factors which had hitherto determined life among them, such as the jealous guarding of local interests, and the uncompromising claim on the part of each city-state to control its own affairs, became relatively unimportant in the face of an external menace which threatened life itself. A congress of representatives met at the Isthmus in the autumn of 481 B.C.¹, and although hampered by the abstention of many powerful states, endeavoured to formulate a Panhellenic policy. Common fear resulted in an effective measure of concerted action and the danger was ultimately overcome. But so deep-rooted were the prejudices and habits of the Greeks on the mainland that the majority of them awoke in 479 B.C. as from an evil dream², and desired nothing better than to relapse into their former condition of city-state sectionalism. The cities of Asia Minor and the Aegean were forced by the danger of their geographical position to favour a more permanent arrangement for federal action, but so stubborn were the old traditions that the new idea of federal organization introduced at this point was destined

¹ Herod. VII, 131, 145.

² Pindar. Isth. VIII, 7-17.

to rend Greece asunder before the close of the century.

The Delian Confederacy, however, was not inspired merely by the pressing need for united action against a common danger from the East. One state, in promoting and developing the federal idea, seems from the first to have been actuated by other motives. Themistocles, who had in 479 boasted that Athens was able to distinguish "both its own and the common interest"¹, evidently considered it necessary for his city to be the first power in Greece if she was to contribute "equal or fair counsel to the common cause"¹. In his naval policy; in his project of commercial development in the west to meet the needs of the growing population which he encouraged, may be observed the passion for Athenian pre-eminence². His entire programme suggests that the old alignment of autonomous communities in Greece was soon to be a thing of the past, since Athenian power could result only in Athenian domination, and in Spartan authority being automatically disputed. It is everywhere apparent that Themistocles considered the reactionary policy of Sparta as a most serious obstacle,³ and undoubtedly his hostility to her was one of the most serious factors contributing to his downfall. The situation after Plataea favoured the rapid development of Athenian policy. The Delian Confederacy was brought into existence by the simple need for protection against Persia, but became increasingly militant under the energetic leadership of Athens, and soon came to be dominated by Athenian ambition. As

¹ Thuc. I, 91.

² Herod. VII, 144: Thuc. I, 14: Plutarch. Themistocles III, IV: G.B. Gundy. Thucydides and the History of his Age, p. 142 ff.

³ Thuc. I, 91. Herod. VIII, 62, etc.

the imperial idea assumed a more precise form, several confederate states perceived the threat to their autonomy involved, but their own folly in having neglected to undertake responsibility had by that time given Athens too strong a hold upon the administration of the league's affairs¹.

The main purpose of Athenian Imperialism, however, was never exploitation, and by the time of Pericles it became quite evident that the enforced unity in time of war or external danger was regarded by some as but the preliminary to a consolidated Hellas pursuing the arts of peace. There is much to be said for Pericles' policy of "keeping a firm hand upon the allies". If they had not been misled by false notions of liberty, the inestimable benefits accruing to membership in the Empire would have been abundantly manifest. But Sparta was not averse to posing as the "Liberator of Hellas", and with the magic watchword of 'liberty' succeeded ultimately in wrecking Athenian schemes before proving conclusively to the Greek world that her professed intentions were as hollow as her political vision was blurred.

Pericles appears not to have been satisfied with limiting the new federal idea to Ionian states; he wanted, if possible, to embrace the whole of Greece. Athens as the "School of Hellas"² represents a moral ideal which, if accepted as such by Greece as a whole, called for a far greater measure of political unity than had obtained formerly to render it practical and secure. In the proposed Panhellenic Congress of 446 there may be seen a serious attempt on the part of Pericles to unite all the cities of Greece

¹ Thuc. I, 99.

² Ibid. II, 35 ff.

in time of peace under the auspices of Athens; and it was mainly through Sparta that this attempt at cohesion was brought to nothing¹. Athens' effort to give a panhellenic cast to her policy in the west is exemplified in the colonization of Thurii in 433 with Athena as the divine patron, but faction between the various elements, Ionian and Dorian, caused the experiment to fail. And as the Peloponnesian War began to loom large on the horizon Pericles was compelled to admit that the passion for complete autonomy among the states would never allow the Greeks to choose voluntarily a permanent form of political organization national in scope.

To the majority of Greeks,^{London,} the events of the Persian war had failed to teach their lesson. If later the cleavage in Greek life came to be expressed in terms of an antithesis between Attic democracy and Dorian oligarchy, the real point at issue all along appears to have been this question of state autonomy versus national unity. Thus it may be said that a "fundamentum divisionis" in the Greek world of 479 B.C. was the manner in which men viewed the crisis through which they had lately passed. On the one hand it was regarded as a triumphant vindication of city-state organization, and it would seem that the institutions which had effected such a remarkable coordination of human virtues should be diligently preserved and defended against any change for the future. On the other hand, some were bound to stress the defects of those same institutions. Only thirty-one states², for the most part small and relatively weak,

¹ Plutarch. Pericles XVII.

² Herod. VII, 145 ff.

had succeeded in burying local differences in order to unite for the common cause. Cities like Thebes were rendered impotent by internal dissension, and political considerations had prevented Sicily, Corcyra, and Argos from undertaking any share in the enterprise. Moreover Greece was saved because Athens had built up a navy out of all proportion to her requirements as a city-state¹. It could also be claimed quite reasonably that "divine favour"² was one of the important factors leading to victory, considering the ill luck which had dogged Persia from the beginning. Such a view of events would naturally suggest a repudiation of policies that had so nearly brought disaster. There remained many excellent features connected with city organization, but Salamis and Plataea could not be regarded as vindicating city-state life in its entirety; they would mark, for liberal-minded citizens, the beginning of a new era in political relationships.

Interest in the problem was quickened by the need for some settled policy after Persia had been forced to retire from the Greek mainland.

Champions of complete city-state independence were not all, like Sparta, inarticulate in their passionate antagonism to the new movement. In Pindar there appeared a most eloquent exponent of their cause. Not that he consciously formulated the issue of city-state autonomy versus federation or empire; but, as we shall try to show from his odes, he unconsciously declares his affiliation with the reactionaries, and represents the very quintessence of the Dorian ideal. Born of the aristocratic Aeolidae at

¹ Herod. VII, 144.

² Herod. VII, 139.

Cynosce malae near Thebes in 518 B.C., Pindar lived through eighty years of vital change in Greece. At an early age he was profoundly affected by the life-and-death struggle taking place about him, and, as we should expect, there is a national pride woven into the fabric of his thought. It must be recognized that in singing the praises of heroes who represent different parts of the Greek world he seems conscious of a character and viewpoint which are common to all Greeks, and which also distinguish them from other peoples. But his national sympathies, if such they may be called, go no further than this, and never involve any political consequences. It has been said that "the triumph which had owed its opportunity to the conception of a national unity could not be worthily commemorated in song which that conception had not helped to inspire"¹. But from a study of the available evidence it may well be questioned whether the triumph did owe its opportunity to any such national ideal. The attitude of Delphi is notorious. Devotion to the common² cause hung by a perilously feeble thread at all times and would inevitably have disappeared had it not been for the energetic reinforcement provided by Themistocles' foresight and ingenuity. After the crisis had passed the motives of the participants were naturally glorified, and such idealization tended to obscure the factors of fear and material interest which actually determined the course of events.

Moreover if the national sentiment of Pindar referred to above is to be rightly appraised we must become reconciled to the

¹ R. C. Jebb. Essays and Addresses: Pindar.

² Herod. VIII, 108: 70: 30.

admission of certain significant defects. He undoubtedly experienced a deep sense of Hellenic kinship. By a felicitous use of his art he invariably links the glory of the individual victor with the glory of his city. The local myths and cults serve at once as a suitable background against which the achievement of the hero may be viewed, and, by their general appeal to the religious consciousness of all Greeks, as illustrative of their sense of spiritual unity. Indeed the poet would seem in this idea of unity to be carried even beyond national boundaries by the religion and psychology which he professes. Delphi had long since found the limits of the Greek world too narrow for the scope of its ambition. Similarly Pindar, in formulating an universal scheme (universal because it was psychological) according to which the life of mortals may be interpreted¹, reaches a point where mere barriers of state or nation have no meaning. *Noces*, *hybris* and *ate* constitute just as much a danger for the

¹ Pindar held the view that human nature responds to certain stimuli in an uniform manner. For example, inordinate prosperity *olbos*, may disturb that mental and moral equilibrium which is indispensable to the individual if he is to resist the fatal poison of passion. Perfect balance, moderation, the rational government of one's affections; these, according to the Greek view, are the factors that distinguish civilized man from barbarian. Passion is a good servant but a bad master; once in control it hurries its miserable victim into ruin. *Olbos* tends to produce a state of mind which derives no satisfaction from things permissible. Appetite is cloyed, and a fatal restlessness supervenes. This state is called *noces*, and in turn breeds a spirit of mischief, *hybris*, of which insolent pride forms a part. Such pride cares nothing for the laws of god or man, and once its victim reaches this stage there is little hope for him; he is led from excess to excess until finally in blindness of heart, *ate*, he plunges to destruction. Cf. *Olympians* I, 55-7; VII, 44 ff.; 89 ff.; XIII, 6-10; *Pythians* I, 71 ff; II, 25 ff. For further elucidation of this scheme vid. p. 116, where these mental or moral states

Footnote 1, continued.

are shown to represent normal stages in man's development or degeneration; e.g. olbos is a very desirable state if the individual allows himself to be controlled by aidos and promatheus (cf. Ol. I, 55; VI, 97). The poet praises wealthy Corinth, "within whose walls dwelleth Law, and her sisters, the firm-set foundation of cities, even Justice and Peace, those guardians of wealth for man, the golden daughters of Themis, and they are resolute in repelling Insolence, the bold-tongued mother of surfeit" (Ol. VIII, 6 ff.). It is also true, however, that if Law and her sisters are absent such a condition has peculiar dangers. Once a man becomes prosperous, his latent ambition and pride naturally tempt him to overreach himself, and unless he exercises a strict self-control, he tends to follow the path to disaster, it being more difficult at each successive stage to arrest the process. Nevertheless, by the right use of his faculties, by exercising self-restraint and forethought, he can prevent such degradation.

Carthaginians and Etruscans as for Hieron of Syracuse. Similarly the vagaries of fortune, dispensing now good, now evil, according to no certain rule; as well as the beneficent influence of aidōs, child of foresight; recognize no limits either within the Greek world or outside it. The poet's references to the doctrines of mystery religions would also seem to indicate a much broader basis for community than mere nationality¹.

But we must remember that Pindar as a poet was occupied in celebrating artistically the whole spiritual legacy of Greece. Like Vergil of later times he would not feel justified in omitting any phase of Greek life which helped in stimulating the imagination or emotions of his countrymen. In consequence it would be a mistake to search for too logical a connection between his speculations. But his national sentiment is of vital significance, and in order to understand it we must consider his politics, an examination of which will enable us to see the poet in his proper historical setting.

It may appear strange to speak of Pindar's political philosophy, but this nevertheless constitutes the key to his anachronistic position in fifth century Greece. As a poet he has no immediate concern with politics, but various passages in the odes clearly reflect a political creed. He refers with pride to the long history of the aristocratic Aegidae (Pyth. V, 73: Isth. VII, 14): he becomes ill at ease when considering the policies of the oligarchical cabal in Thebes during the Persian invasion, and prefers the "noblesse oblige" of earlier aristocracies, where privilege was considered in the light of responsibility. "In

¹ OI. II, 56-83: Dirges 129: 130: 131: 133: 137: 143.

politics I find moderation crowned with more enduring good, and condemn the tyrant's lot. I am zealous for those virtues that serve the common good, where a man by avoiding dread insolence attains pre-eminence and dwells in peace, and mischievous envy is warded off" (Pyth. XI, 53 ff.).

Composing an ode in honour of Hieron of Syracuse (Pyth. II, 86-8), the poet expresses the belief that individual virtue will triumph under any form of government, "at the tyrant's court; where the raging crowd is in control; or where the wise have care of the state". A glance at the terms employed (

) shows at once where his preference lies. Indeed it is inconceivable that any democratic principle should be acceptable to Pindar. Men are brave and wise according to fate (Ol. VIII, 28): that which comes by nature is always best (Ol. VIII, 100): and while few have won without toil the joy of life, the hero is actually born for prowess (Ol. X, 20): nobility is the gift of nature (Pyth. VIII, 45): valour is in-born and cannot be acquired (Nem. III, 40). Where ~~god~~ ^{God} so clearly discriminates in apportioning his gifts, aristocracy would appear to be a natural form of government. But since even among the more favoured few some enjoy a richer endowment of virtue than others, the best government would proceed from a very small minority, perhaps even from the best man. Pindar accepts this logical conclusion, but is at once confronted with serious practical difficulties. The particular form of excellence which places a tyrant in political control differs from other virtues which, in spite of their desirability from a moral or aesthetic standpoint, lack that particular quality which could place them in a position of pre-eminence. The very position of the tyrant

is also fraught with peculiar danger. Power and wealth tend to corrupt their holder, and some restraining influence is necessary if *hybris* and *ate* are to be avoided¹. Thus Pindar seeks to make tyranny self-regulative by introducing a judicious blend of moral virtue.

From this it may be seen that Pindar was not far removed politically from Homer. His affinity with the heroic spirit is seen in a variety of ways, but in none so clearly as in his glorification of individual achievement. Pelops regards a life without glory as no life (Ol. I, 81 ff.), and the expressed hope that victory after victory may crown the efforts of both poet and tyrant suggests that Pindar in putting such faith in individual prowess was spiritually at one with the heroes of old. Immortality consists in the fame secured by artistic celebration; "When a man, Hagesidamus, who has performed noble exploits, comes to the house of Hades without the fame which song affords, he has gained but little pleasure from his effort, his strength being spent in vain" (Ol. X, 91-3). "When men are dead it is only the loud acclaim of praise that survives and reveals their mode of life" (Pyth. I, 94). Wealth, honour, and glory (Pyth. II, 56); wealth and wisdom (Pyth. V, 1: Nem. IX, 46), are to be desired above all things, and they can be won only in this life. Under such conditions the individual, in common with his heroic forebears, can regard social restrictions only as an obstacle to the full expression of personality. He wishes to shake himself free from common rules which merely him down to a common level. In his splendid isolation he is a

¹ Cf. Ol. VI, 97: Ol. VII, 44: Ol. VII, 89.

law unto himself. Law and justice have their seat only in the individual heart, as in the case of Thrasybulus, who is guided in the exercise of his power only by those sanctions which he chooses to recognize (Pyth. VI, 44 ff.), or in the case of Hieron who is benevolently paternal to the Syracusans (Pyth. III, 71).

Thus even in the life of the city justice and peace can never be guaranteed as by an accepted body of constitutional rules. Freedom of expression will be for those who are able to marshal sufficient force to attain their ends, and in the exercise of their power the determining factor will be personal inclination. Pindar, enjoying the favour of his patrons, is content to leave justice and wise behaviour in the hands of aidōs, unmindful of the fact that aidōs, though sired by Discernment¹, is too often still-born. Here, as in the Iliad, supreme importance is given to the disposition of the individual. Law and justice in the community are only the reflection of those qualities in the individual heart. But as the history of tyrannies shews, generous instincts usually involve too great a personal sacrifice, and for this reason rarely triumph over less amiable qualities.

~~Greek tyrants enjoy a well-deserved reputation for fostering the arts, and Pindar may perhaps be forgiven for allowing the charm and elation of his own peculiar position to obscure the serious drawbacks implicit in the system. For he was after all a tyrant in his little world and not too well-disposed to encourage contestants for his crown.~~² Ultimately however he was dependent

¹ Ol. VII, 44.

² Cf. Ol. II, 84 ff.: Ol. IX, 100 ff.: Nem. III, 40: Pyth. I, 45: 85: Pyth. 90 ff.

In thus drawing attention to Hinder's emphasis upon individual enterprise, we remain conscious of two conditioning factors. In the first place, his references to law must be noted. He has regard for the merit of Hieron in founding the city of Etna according to the laws of Hyllus, and refers to the sons of Pamphylus as willing to abide for ever as Dorians under the ordinances of Aegimius (Pyth. I, 62 ff.). Hieron wields the sceptre of law in fruitful Sicily (Ol. I, 12), and it is implied that Etna enjoyed the blessings of righteous laws (Mem. IX, 29). In Corinth there dwell Law, Justice, and Peace, and these keep Insolence and Surfeit at a distance (Ol. XIII, 6 ff.).

But it would be a mistake to assume that in this way the tyrant suffered any legal restriction upon his will, or that his subjects enjoyed any guarantee of justice. In place of the justice that proceeds from constitutional rights we find a paternalism dependent upon the inclination of the tyrant. "Thus had I visited . . . the lord of Etna who ruleth at Syracuse as a king who is gentle to his citizens, bearing no grudge against them that are noble, adored as a father by his friends" (Pyth. III, 69 ff.). The welfare of Agragas depends not upon her laws, but upon Theron, who is just in his regard for guests (Ol. II, 5), and noted for his beneficence and generosity (Ol. II, 25). The conventional Greek attitude to tyranny, a form of government which rendered unquestionable service in many respects, was based, we believe, on the fact that the tyrant, being "legibus solutus", denied citizens that constitutional freedom which they considered the indispensable right of every free man. Hinder, however,

with his marked admiration for tyrants would seem to dissociate himself from this view.

In the second place it should be stated that we are far from arguing that Pindar, because he favoured for the tyrant a right of initiative unhampere^d by legal restrictions, therefore believed in no restriction at all. Nothing could be farther from the truth. He constantly emphasizes the need for moral restraint (cf. Ol. VII, 44 ff; 84 ff). Tantalus allowed his power to become out of hand with fatal results (Ol. I, 55): man cannot escape the eye of God (Ol. I, 64). Forethought and a reverent consideration for what is moral prevent a man ignoring the path of duty (Ol. VII, 44). Zeus helps the leader of men to honour the people and turn them to concord and peace (Pyth. I, 69). God's help is constantly necessary (Ol. I, 107; Pyth. I, 56). In close connection with this moral restraint may also be considered family tradition. Diagoras is praised for having learnt the lessons prompted by the prudence which he inherits from his goodly ancestors (Ol. VII, 91). Thrasybulus comes nearest to the standard of duty to one's father, vying with his father's brother in all manner of splendour, with wisdom tending his wealth (Pyth. VI, 44 ff.). Theron is the choicest flower of an auspicious line, whose sires by laborious effort founded a hallowed home . . . bringing wealth and glory to crown their native merits (Ol. II, 7).

But moral restraint of this kind always proves unsatisfactory as a guarantor of proper conduct. The individual must first of all have the wit to understand, and next the will to submit.

It would seem that for all but the choicest souls prosperity and pride effectually smother good sense as well as conscience. To raise the cry of morality among people who have not perforce to accept legal restraint is, human nature being what it is, merely to court disaster. Thus we are led to the view that Pindar in placing such faith in moral law as a guide to human conduct, was unwittingly encouraging the display of those undesirable qualities which inevitably appear when the use of power is not governed by some law more practical and effective.

Greek tyrants enjoy a well-deserved reputation for fostering the arts, and Pindar may perhaps be forgiven for allowing the charm and elation of his own peculiar position to obscure the serious drawbacks implicit in the system. For he was after all a tyrant in his little world and not too well-disposed to encourage contestants for his crown¹. Ultimately however he was dependent

¹ Cf. Ol. II, 84 ff.; Ol. IX, 100 ff.; Nem. III, 40; Pyth. I, 45; 85; Pyth. 90 ff.

upon patronage, and the grace and dignity with which he accepts favours can never quite obscure the ambiguity of his position.

Now if Pindar lagged so far behind the local developments of his day in matters of social and political life, how infinitely remote was he from the spirit which envisaged a really united Greece. The short ode in honour of Megacles of Athens (Pyth. VII) illustrates the extent to which Pindar's thinking is bedevilled by outworn notions of personal freedom. The problem which commanded the attention of Greece at the beginning of the fifth century was really concerned with liberty rather than with freedom. That is to say, the time had come to place some check upon the irresponsible expression of personal inclination in order that common safeguards could render permanent the proper enjoyment of common freedom in reasonably full measure. Freedom tends to overreach itself, but liberty is stable, based upon compromise and conformity to law. Pindar regards ostracism as a gratuitous attack upon individual freedom. Envy, which can brook no form of excellence, was thought to be responsible for Megacles' banishment (Pyth. VII, 15 ff.). But the original purpose of ostracism was to check excessive ambition and thus to preserve liberty for all¹. In performing this function it could hardly be regarded as a weapon of envy. Whatever its later history, ostracism could claim rational justification in the case of Megacles, whose sympathetic association with the Pisistratids constituted a real menace to Athenian liberty. Pindar, of course, would not agree. With his obsolete gospel of free enterprise he was endangering the very condition of life which rendered it possible. Such freedom inevitably fashions a noose for its own neck; but Pindar remained quite unaware of

¹ Aristotle. Pol. 1284a: 1302b.

the consequences of his own doctrine. He failed to see that a much surer measure of individual freedom, more secure from foes within and without, could be gained in submission to a sterner public discipline. The artists of the generation which followed experienced no appreciable cramping of style, if we may judge from the works that they created. And at the same time the effort of Athens in trying to persuade the separatists to make good their professions of Panhellenism by committing themselves to common responsibilities was the only way to ensure a condition of life where freedom could flourish permanently. This effort was none the less praiseworthy because of its tragic failure.

His philosophy of the individual earns Pindar the right to be ranged with Hesiod as a champion of the ancient order, and such doctrine continued to obstruct humanistic development at all points throughout the fifth century. Political liberalism in the tradition of Solon and Cleisthenes, implemented by Pericles, struggled valiantly against those reactionary forces which were disrupting the life of the polis as much as the life of Greece as a whole, and it is a little ironical that the city-state should owe its cohesiveness in the fifth century to the political sagacity of two outstanding Alcmaeonids, and its disruption in no small measure to the political irresponsibility of a third; for Alcibiades remains the greatest exponent of Pindar's political philosophy.

It is curious that Pindar has so little to say concerning the Persian War. The role chosen by Thebes hardly invited celebration, but we might expect more references to the parts played by other states. He is glad that Greece is set free from mighty woes, and that the stone of Tantalus has been turned

aside (Isthm. VIII, 7 ff.). Reference is made to Salamis and Plataea, where the Medes with curved bows suffered sorely (Pyth. I, 78), and to Salamis, where Aegina was saved by her seamen (Isth. V, 48-9). Athens is also addressed as the "bulwark of Hellas" (Dith 76). But the conflict with Persia seems never to have prompted on the part of the poet any reflection as to its real significance. We receive the impression that for Pindar the Persian War represented a climax rather than a crisis. Just as the sacred games brought out all that was most noble in human virtue, so the struggle with Persia was regarded by him as providing a supreme occasion for the final glorification of the heroic spirit. Just as with Pindar the choral lyric was perfected, so the spirit which it exemplified experienced its final triumph. It remained for others to profit fully from the warning which had so thoroughly unnerved Greece before 480 B.C., and, not neglecting the gift of God¹, bend every effort towards securing their position for the future.

In this criticism of Pindar's political thought we have tried to indicate his reactionary view of freedom as a political factor in Greek life. Ultimately, however, there was for him no problem of State as such; he was concerned rather with the problem of the individual. Thus in order to gain any proper understanding of his view of life it remains for us to examine his psychology.

Reference has already been made to the poet's habit of incorporating contradictory religious ideas into his thought, and it was suggested that the nature of his work precludes too care-

¹ Herod. VII, 139.

ful a search for logical connection. As in the case of Vergil his style as an artist was synthetic rather than analytic, and no aspect of life which added colour or beauty to the composite picture could rightly be ignored. At the same time there are bound to be certain prevailing ideas which by the constancy of their recurrence indicate at least a strong preference on the part of the poet. For instance, conflict must be observed between Pindar's different statements concerning the nature of immortality. At times he seems to anticipate a fully conscious existence for the soul after death, a doctrine strongly reminiscent of the Mystery religions; although the morality which determines the nature of such survival appears to be a consistency of noble action rather than conformity to a creed and to specific religious ritual¹. At other times it would appear that death mutilates the personality beyond recognition. Battus (Pyth. V, 93) after an exemplary life rests in death in the market-place of Cyrene. His descendants, "the other holy kings, whom fate has sent to Hades, hear after the fashion of the nether world the account of his lofty prowess". This prowess it is the function of song to celebrate and thus render immortal. It is noteworthy that the only vital factor after death is fame, and Pindar invariably lays great stress upon it, to the exclusion even of such attenuated life as Achilles anticipated among the shades. Such a view of death and immortality must necessarily exercise a profound influence upon one's view of life, and Pindar's heroes are guided by very practical ideals which never outrun human experience. They are expressly commanded not to seek after the life of the Immortals, since the loud acclaim of

¹ Cl. II, 56-84: Dirges 129-30: 131: 133: 137.

praise alone survives (Pyth. III, 61).

Again it is difficult to see how the doctrine of essential human equality, upheld by the Mysteries, can be reconciled with the view of human nature which characterizes most of Pindar's work. It is true that "the race of men is one, as is also the race of gods; and from one mother both drew breath" (Mem. VI, 1 ff.). Men may also experience a common inability to see the future, but such equality of condition can mean very little. The mass of mortals never overcome the initial handicap imposed by God. They continue throughout life ineffectual, doomed after death to suffer extinction, 'unwept, unhonoured, and unsung'.

To what extent is the individual subject to forces outside his control, and how does such subjection affect his freedom of action? It is stated that we owe our entry into the world to Ilithyia in association with the Fates. But our lots in life are not equal, fettered as we are by fate in the chain of destiny (Mem. VII, 1 ff.). The poet in "tilling the choicest garden of the graces" is exercising a gift of destiny, just as Heracles owed his bravery to fate (Ol. IX, 26 ff.). Fate is often referred to as a function of nature (*φύσις*). It is by the gift of nature that noble spirits shine forth to view (Pyth. VIII, 45). Favoured mortals are born for prowess (Ol. X, 20); their valour is innate (Mem. III, 40). Natural virtue of this kind is contrasted with the counterfeit variety which proceeds from mere training (Ol. X, 100). Nature (*ἄρα*) gave to the sons of Aletes victory in the sacred games, and it has ever been responsible for inventive genius (Ol. XIII, 17). The true poet enjoys his insight as a gift of nature (Ol. II, 86).

Occasionally, as in the Iliad¹, "fate" and "god" become interchangeable terms. The gift of healing disease, spiritual as well as physical, proceeds from Apollo (Pyth. V, 52-3). From the gods come the means by which excellence is attained (Pyth. I, 41: Mem. III, 40). Zeus is lord of all and various are his gifts (Isth. V, 52-3).

Now if this were all; if fate or god could be looked upon as decreeing man's essential nature at the outset, there would be little to interfere with individual freedom, since destiny would be almost equivalent to character. In point of fact many pitfalls can be avoided by the exercise of true discretion, and discretion may be learned, since human nature tends to respond to common stimuli in an uniform manner. For instance, great prosperity (olbos) brought about the ruin of Tantalus. He became surfeited with good things (koros) and in blindness of heart (hybris) fell upon destruction (até) (Ol. I, 55 ff.). Ixion owed his disastrous end to the madness of spirit (hybris) bred of great prosperity (Pyth. II, 28). Overweening insolence brought ruin upon Etruria and Carthage (Pyth. I, 72). The fear is expressed that Hieron may in time succumb to the fatal wiles of prosperity (Ol. VI, 97). The fact is that god represents moral law and no man can escape if he transgress it (Ol. I, 64). May Zeus continue to grant Diagoras an illumined conscience, for he has so far kept to a straight path and avoided insolence, having learned from the uprightness of his noble ancestors (Ol. VII, 87 ff.). Forethought, or experiential knowledge (*προμαθεύς*) fosters a reverent consideration for what is moral

¹ See Ch. I, p.

(αἰδώς). This involves a conscious discipline and prevents "strange clouds of forgetfulness" from causing the straight path of duty to be ignored (Ol. VII, 44 ff.). There is due measure (μέτρον) in all things, and it is best above all else to learn the fitting time (καιρός). Kairos represents the conjunction of events which allows of successful human action. It can be recognized by the discerning man, but passion dulls perception (Ol. XIII, 47 ff.). Observance of the opportune time in matters of speech prevents the disordered misunderstanding which follows the utterance of foolish temerity (Pyth. I, 81).

Here, it seems, there is a place for individual freedom within the framework of natural law. Such doctrines do not imply capricious meddling on the part of gods nor do they involve a thorough-going determinism. Where ebos, koros, hybris, prudence, peace or justice are personified or given, as it were, a divine standing, their reality remains purely subjective, as is shown by the fact that their activity is completely governed by the individual's thought and conduct. They merely mark the normal stages in man's development or degeneration. Fate represents the inner compulsion of habitual acts, and although such compulsion gathers momentum as it works, it is always within the range of human ability to stem the tide and divert its flow.

When we consider the means by which men exercise this freedom, however, we encounter serious difficulties. It is impossible to know whether unforeseen obstacles to the free expression of human purpose result from inability to comprehend the workings of natural law or whether they are to be attributed to other factors by nature incalculable. Wealth, we are told, is a gift received at the hands of fate (Pyth. V, 1), while victory does not depend

on men alone: god exalts or lays low, as it pleases him (Pyth. VIII, 76). Man's happiness is never secure, it is often shattered by an adverse doom (Pyth. VIII, 93); and this reflection introduces a strong note of pessimism. What are we after all but creatures of a day, shadowy dreams? Only when heaven sends a ray of sunshine can radiant light rest upon men and peaceful life be theirs (Pyth. VIII, 95-7). With Zeus alone it lies to bestow upon Aetna the gift of righteous laws (Nem. IX, 29).

So we conclude that misfortunes are not to be explained entirely as natural defects in the human constitution. There are incalculable factors which can only be accepted with resignation. Man must not contend with god, who exalts the power now of some now of others (Pyth. II, 88). Hieron must learn from traditional wisdom that the immortals dispense two measures of pain to one of joy. Foolish men cannot bear these trials in an orderly manner, but the noble can, if they look upon the bright side (Pyth. III, 80 ff.). Men can never know what the future holds in store (Nem. VI, 6): the envy of the immortals may conceivably mar even the poet's pleasure (Isth. VII, 39: Ol. XIII, 25).

Thus it seems that the individual is able to exercise only limited control over destiny. Up to a point he may guard against error and frustration, but in the end the course of life is largely determined by factors unpredictable and beyond human control. Pindar is ever anxious to avoid the "envy of the gods", which only means that he is impressed with the incalculability of the future. "Why claim that to be wisdom in which one man scarcely excels another? It is impossible for the human mind to discover

divine purposes, and this is a condition of one's mortal nature' (Dithyrambs 61). "Changeful are the winds that blow on high: the bliss of man continues not for long (Pyth. III, 104). "Various are the currents that bring to men now joy, now pain" (Ol. II, 35). So much depends on Fortune ($\tau\upsilon\chi\eta$). Indeed she is the saving goddess, daughter of Zeus the Beliverer (Ol. XII, 1). Fortune is the giver of all success, and victors in the games do well to pay her proper deference (Pyth. VIII, 72: Nem. X, 25: Nem. V, 48: Ol. XIV, 15). The fear is expressed that the good fortune of Xenarces may blind him to the precariousness of his position (Pyth. VIII, 72). Even the "words which live longer than deeds", the fair praise which ensures one's immortality, depends upon the kindly offices of the Graces. Consequently good fortune ($\tau\omicron\ \pi\alpha\rho\theta\epsilon\iota\upsilon\ \epsilon\tilde{\nu}$) is more to be desired than all else (Pyth. I, 99: cf. also Pyth. II, 56: Ol. XIII, 115: Isth. V, 15). Together with fair praise it cherishes the sweetest bloom of life.

Now the virtues which contribute most to human happiness and success are discretion and stoutness of heart. The former ($\pi\rho\omicron\mu\alpha\rho\upsilon\sigma$) has already been dealt with, and we may now turn to a consideration of the part that toil ($\pi\omicron\rho\omicron\varsigma\ \kappa\acute{\iota}\nu\eta\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma$) plays in Pindar's view of life. Alcimedon (the name itself being a good omen) owed his victory in the boys' wrestling match at Olympia to two factors, heaven-sent fortune ($\tau\upsilon\chi\eta\ \delta\alpha\iota\mu\omicron\nu\omicron\theta\omicron\varsigma$), and to his own manliness ($\acute{\alpha}\rho\epsilon\tau\acute{\epsilon}\alpha\varsigma\ \omicron\upsilon\kappa\ \acute{\alpha}\mu\pi\lambda\alpha\kappa\upsilon\acute{\rho}$) (Ol. VIII, 67). Thus one function of toil or effort is to act as a spur to human achievement. It is at this point that Pindar seems to identify himself ^{most} with the heroic point of view. Difficulties constitute a challenge to initiative and enterprise, and the continual impact between man and his environment gives rise constantly to new

triumphs. Spontaneity, vigour, resourcefulness, and overmastering ambition are called into being and carry the subject on their tide. That is why the poet frequently interjects salutary warnings, trying to offset the "headiness" of success. The practical man "par excellence" emerges with his fetish-worship of success. "In success resides the crown of perfect glory, and the Muse delights to call to mind mighty contests".

From this point of view all struggle merely subserves passion for glory. Political difficulties with which tyrants are faced; obstacles which confront contestants in the sacred games; the formidable threat of Persian domination; all alike come to be regarded as the material out of which heroes are made (Ol. XII: Ol. X, 22: Ol. I, 106 ff: Ol. XI, 4: Pyth. I, 72 ff.).

It is therefore useless to represent Pindar as the poet of peace¹. The spirit of rivalry was in his blood. It is claimed that "we can often feel in Pindar that new sense of leisure for peaceful pursuits and civilizing arts which came after the Persian Wars there breathes in his poetry such a measure of sacred peace as the Olympic festival itself proclaimed every year to Hellas"². But strife was for him as much an integral part of life as for his Ephesian contemporary Heraclitus. Strife "stiffens the sinews and summons up the blood"; it proves a man's mettle, and those who triumph experience a congratulatory sense of achievement, itself the very wine of life. If toil and strife represent a fundamental condition of human happiness; if they constitute the necessary challenge to enterprise, then there can hardly be any real distinction between peace and war (Pyth. II, 6).

¹ R. C. Jebb. Essays and Addresses: Pindar.

² Op. cit.

War is merely a fuller manifestation of the spirit which actuates men in what is conventionally known as peace. The competitive spirit knows no limit and is the necessary correlative of the philosophy of the individual.

It is also apparent, however, that Pindar recognizes another function of toil. "Any prosperity that mortals experience comes only as a result of toil, yet a god can put an end to such bliss in the twinkling of an eye" (Pyth. XII, 28). The gospel of individualism was outworn, and Pindar was constrained to make room for possible frustration of human purpose. It is often impossible, owing to some intervention of fortune, to triumph in the ordinary sense over obstacles and adversity. "Many unforeseen things happen to man: some experience reversal of delight, while others after battling with a sea of troubles, in a short time have exchanged their anguish for deepest joy" (Ol. XII, 10). Here the poet seems concerned with glory of a different kind, the mystical glory won after grievous trouble or suffering. Such suffering may be the result of sin. Diagoras of Rhodes had apparently triumphed over some early misfortune of this kind and won his way to renown at Olympia (Ol. VII). Throughout the entire ode this note is sustained in a remarkable manner. The spiritual triumph of Diagoras is reflected in the experience of Telepoleus, of the sons of Helios, and of Helios himself. There is a pronounced consciousness of joy and suffering in Ol. II, 8. Theron, together with other illustrious members of his line, won his way to wealth and glory through such labour and suffering. But it is in connection with Hieron of Syracuse that the doctrine appears most clearly. Peleus and Cadmus had both known the disciplinary value of reverses, the pilgrim's

from pain to joy. Hieron was afflicted with serious physical trouble; he was urged to accept his burden and not to kick against the pricks (Pyth. II, 93). Noble men can bear their trials with good grace (Pyth. III, 82). Thus it may happen that if the wheel of fortune turns, the warrior is obliged to adopt the role of martyr.

This dual function of toil also has its counterpart in Pindar's doctrine of the Graces (*Χαίρες*). The Graces are the queens of song that keep watch over the ancient Minyae. By their aid all things sweet and pleasant are accomplished for mortals; from them come artistic skill, physical beauty, and personal prowess. They are the ministrants of heavenly things, and the gods enlist their aid in ordering the dance or banquet (Ol. XIV, 1-12). They shed over victors a shower of glory (Ol. VI, 76), and from them life receives its bloom (Ol. VII, 11). The poet in celebrating the glorious deeds of men is "tilling the choicest garden of the Graces" (Ol. IX, 27). They are the handmaids of the artist (Pyth. IX, 54: Isth. V, 21), and are figured as a chorus glorifying human achievement (Mem. VI, 38).

The Graces stand for everything artistic, and represent the difference between mere existence and the "good life", between barbarism and civilization. They and all the instruments associated with them speak of culture and spiritual illumination. But as handmaids of the victorious hero their office is not merely to glorify his success; they also provide comfort and consolation when things go wrong. They offer the soothing element (Ol. I, 30), and prevent his nobility being enshrouded in dust (Ol. VIII, 8). They attend upon the victor not merely as a warrior, but also as a crusader.

Thus Pindar declares his view of human nature. Utterly opposed to the democratic tendencies of his day he takes his stand with the ancients in upholding aristocratic exclusiveness. From him we learn no more of the mass of humanity than we do from Homer. He believes that true merit is implanted in only a few mortals at birth, and the function of society as a whole is to ensure perfect freedom of expression for genius. The artist's task is to glorify the supremely practical man and enshrine him in the hearts of all. But the world of Homer had long since passed away, and the growth of commerce had brought with it a more liberal outlook. Inherited characteristics or innate qualities, which Pindar had seen fit to stress exclusively (Ol. X, 100), were being challenged by "acquired virtues". The mass of people no longer considered it their duty to sacrifice themselves to the ambition of a privileged minority. With this levelling influence at work, prompted by economic factors and supported by religion, the heroics of Pindar no longer enjoyed a suitable milieu. The practical ideals for which the poet stood were no longer practicable, and we recognize his protest in the spiritualization of those virtues which had originally been so eminently practical and concrete.

CONCLUSION.

From the foregoing study it is possible to discern gradual clarification in the concept of freedom.

Life was too easy for Homer's heroes of the Iliad. At no point was their freedom sufficiently challenged. They were fortunate in having unconsciously found adjustment to their physical environment, a balance which was so satisfactory that it called for no real understanding. From this equilibrium arises their ingenuousness and the charm which accompanies lack of self-consciousness. Life for them was so simple and straightforward that there appeared no necessity for examining the unique conditions which rendered it possible. But once outside pressure disturbed perfect balance, the heroic spirit could find no proper home. The aristocratic organization of society had in time come to rest by force of habit upon assumptions, and such habit prevented men from adjusting themselves readily to new conditions. We have noted how the experience of Odysseus after the Trojan War suggests the change already taking place.

Following the Dorian migrations environmental conditions in Greece threatened to stifle any sense of freedom which may have survived; but one man was bold enough to accept the challenge. The servility which Hesiod observed on all sides prompted him to reclaim a measure of dignity for his countrymen. He could not hope to make them lords of the universe: they were too jaded for that; but by endeavouring to establish their proper place in relation to the world of nature, and by integrating all experience in terms of a perfect law of justice, he was the first to suggest a direct relationship between liberty and law. But in his anxiety

to view man in correct relationship to the universe, and to put him right with ~~god~~, Hesiod neglected to examine the springs of action. Existing moral conditions were to be judged according to a new standard of ideal rightness; but that did not alter human conduct. Owing to human nature the rule of justice could not become effective without adequate power to enforce it. Hesiod merely deplored the avarice of princes: he saw no means of checking it. The inert mass of humanity which he sought to aid certainly showed little promise of securing constitutional freedom for themselves.

The years which elapsed between Hesiod and Solon produced no solution to this problem, but they did provide fresh light on the nature of power. As the agricultural economy broke down in the face of commercial enterprise it became clear that vested rights were no longer inviolable. A new confidence was born of the life which set people free from the tyranny of the soil. Not that freedom and justice were necessarily any nearer of achievement, for other tyrants were ready to press their claims, but the new liberalism undoubtedly suggested to Solon the idea of human responsibility. Even though the mass of people in an agricultural state such as Attica still showed little promise, the fact that individuals could cast off the incubus of oppression and fight their way to power and influence would suggest that the principle once established might be employed in the interest of all instead of one. Hence under Solon the problem assumed a political form. With his ideal of *eúνομία* he sought to coordinate justice and power by giving to men in the group sufficient of the latter to secure the former.

This ordering of life in conformity with effective law was in advance of the age in which Solon lived. His work, however, was not destroyed under the tyranny which followed. So broad and sound had been its appeal that the Peisistratids, although violating the spirit in which the task had been undertaken, could not afford to discard the forms in which it had been expressed. The impetus given to initiative, moreover, by the tyrants in their commercial policy ensured an early return to, and an extended application of, the constitutional principles laid down by Solon. With Cleisthenes these principles were revived and found fuller expression now that the people were more competent to undertake responsibility. The old social institutions lost all real significance, and the traditional influence of families gave way to the new alignment of deme, trittys, and tribe. A large number of natives and strangers were registered as citizens and enfranchised on the registers of the various demes¹, and all citizens upon admission to their deme adopted the deme, instead of the family, name². Thus they gained "a certificate of civic rights and a symbol of equality"³. By grouping demes from different sections of Attica into trittyses, purely local interests could no longer prevail in public discussion. The ten new tribes, each comprising three trittyses, took their names from popular heroes⁴, and thus another blow was struck at family influence. Fifty members of each tribe were chosen by lot to form the new council of 500⁵, so that the people

¹ Arist. Politics III, 2, 3.

⁴ Herod. V, 66, 69.

² Arist. Ath. Pol., 21, 4.

⁵ Arist. Ath. Pol. 21, 3.

³ Glotz & Cohen. Histoire Grecque, Tome II, p. 470.

were truly represented by an executive body. With such a constitution it would appear that equality had come to be an established fact, and the reign of law to supersede that of tradition.

From a political standpoint it may be claimed that on the eve of the Persian War Athens was the most progressive city in Greece. Liberty was established; and Herodotus was right in pointing to this achievement of Cleisthenes as the main cause of Athenian greatness.¹ Elsewhere in Greece other experiments in freedom had been made. The Ionian lyrists gave great freedom to human emotion, which had formerly expressed itself in narrow conventional channels. But their passion ran riot; and we have endeavoured to show that such a symptom was characteristic, in greater or less degree, of all Ionian life during the seventh and sixth centuries B.C. The Ionians confused liberty with license, and ruined themselves by an insane individualism.

For the Milesian philosophers the question of freedom, strictly speaking, did not arise. But the new outburst of intellectual vigour was destined to play a most important part in the emancipation of the human spirit, since such a radical change of direction in thought could not fail ultimately to affect all forms of human activity.

In Pindar it is as though the problem had never been. Pindar remained the slave of an aristocratic tradition, and never succeeded in seeing himself in proper relation to his

¹ Herod. V, 78.

environment. Obligated upon occasion to come to terms with new factors which could no longer be ignored, such compromise as he made never involved more than a series of reluctant concessions.

But the conflict with Persia marked a crisis for Hellenism. The old laissez-faire almost ruined the Greek cause, and enterprising minds were not loth to profit from their fortunate escape. For a few brilliant years we witness an attempt on the part of Athens to reconstruct public life in terms of a social rather than an individualistic philosophy. For better or worse the march of events had proved the old ideas untenable, and unless the Greeks were willing to forswear the new privileges and render themselves once more vulnerable to intestinal discord and external aggression, they had to accept a much more exacting regimentation. And it is interesting to note that although fourth century political philosophers viewed with so much horror the democratic excesses into which Athens unfortunately fell in attempting to establish the new order, they went even further in their prohibition of private rights and in their emphasis upon public order and discipline.

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